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ONLINE TAXATION POST WAYFAIR
Rifat Azam*

ABSTRACT
The United States Supreme Court saved the states’ sales tax base
in the landmark case of South Dakota v. Wayfair in 2018. This
revolutionary decision ended the long ban on states imposing sales
tax collection duties on out-of-state retailers without a physical
presence in the state, as established in Bellas Hess v. Department
of Revenue of Illinois in 1967 and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota in
1992. Wayfair now allows states to impose sales taxation on outof-state retailers in the era of digitalization. In this article, I
provide valuable guidelines and suggestions to aid states on this
critical journey toward taxing remote online transactions fairly
and efficiently.
Specifically, this article strongly supports the state-by-state
approach to taxing remote vendors. I emphasize that the first step
for each state is to make appropriate policy decisions that fit the
interests of that state and to structure its legal frameworks
accordingly. At the same time, a multistate layer of harmonization,
coordination, and cooperation is essential to the long-term
success of online taxation. Therefore, this article argues that states
should develop and improve the current framework of the
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement by implementing
insights from the European Union’s value-added tax system,
which is a result of far greater experience taxing online
transactions.
Toward that end, this article contributes significant proposals,
including the proposal to allow vendors to account for the sales
tax in one state, the state of registration, and the proposal to
establish a multistate clearinghouse for handling the balances
between the states efficiently. This article also contains proposals
to increase the use of tax compliance technologies, especially
cloud computing, block-chain, and big data. These technologies
automate the process of calculating and collecting sales tax in the
most efficient manner. Next, this article suggests facilitating tax
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data sharing and tax collection through payment intermediaries,
entities which already have the data and stand at the critical
juncture of online transactions. Finally, this article recommends
that Congress participate in the states’ efforts to tax online
transactions by applying these proposals to international
transactions. As the digital transformation of the economy
accelerates, each one of these proposals and measures would
enhance sales taxation in the era of e-commerce and digitalization
post Wayfair.
INTRODUCTION
On June 21st, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court made a revolutionary decision
in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., opening the door for states to impose sales tax
collection duties on out-of-state sellers.1 This landmark case overruled a long
constitutional ban preventing states from imposing such duties without the seller’s
physical presence in the state, as established by National Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue of Illinois in 1967 and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota in 1992.2
Based on interpretations of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and the modern
realities of e-commerce and digitalization, the Wayfair Court recognized that
economic and virtual contacts could constitute a substantial nexus with a state. In
doing so, Wayfair saved the states’ sales tax base for the 21st century.
Given this era of digitalization and e-commerce, the consequences and
implications of Wayfair are tremendous on all remote sellers, especially online
remote sellers. Wayfair opens the door to a better way of collecting sales tax. If states
want to do so, based on individual policy, they should join the Streamlined Sales and
Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA) as well as enhance compliance and efficiency by
looking toward the European Union (E.U.) and emerging technologies. This article
makes four key contributions to the current and significant debate in academia,
governments, and markets, regarding online sales taxation post Wayfair. 3
First, this article suggests that a state-by-state approach, rather than a federal
approach, is the right approach for the future of online sales tax. The states govern
sales taxation. Each state sets, and should continue to set, its own rules of taxation in
the best way that fits that state’s circumstances and serves its residents and local
economy. There is no one rule that fits all. Under the state-by-state approach, each
state should first make a policy decision whether to impose the collection duty on
out-of-state sellers or not, along with what the appropriate threshold is based on
considerations of tax revenues, compliance burdens, economic effects, growth,
fairness, and many others. Once that policy decision is made, each state should
structure and design an appropriate legal framework. This article strongly supports
the economic nexus model, as reflected in South Dakota’s law in Wayfair, and calls
for each state to follow it in a harmonized way and to eliminate or limit other models,
1. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. 138 S.Ct. 2080 (2018).
2. See Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967); see also Quill Corp.
v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
3. See, e.g., Adam B. Thimmesch, The Unified Dormant Commerce Clause, 92 TEMP. L. REV. 331
(2020); Hayes R. Holderness, Navigating 21st Century Tax Jurisdiction, 79 MD. L. REV. 1 (2019).
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such as the affiliate model or click through model. However, copying South Dakota’s
law exactly, which many states did after Wayfair, is highly discouraged. The need
for each state to structure its laws and tax thresholds carefully and wisely to achieve
the specific state’s policy goals is of utmost importance. Although this approach
might cause interstate tax competition, the incentives for multistate coordination and
cooperation are stronger. Multistate coordination is essential and beneficial for postWayfair sales taxation, as proven by the SSUTA, which simplified and harmonized
sales taxation among its member states. This article builds upon the SSUTA
platform, which is the starting point on the long journey toward improving the system
of collecting sales taxes from remote online businesses and transactions.
Second, in building the essential multistate layer of coordination and
cooperation, this article suggests learning from Europe’s long experience coping
with the challenges of value-added taxes (VAT), as consumption tax, in a multijurisdictional setting in the era of digitalization, e-commerce, and cloud computing.4
Accordingly, this article calls to intensify and deepen the processes of harmonization
and simplification that started with the SSUTA. Gaps in the base between states
should be reduced through multi-state agreement on a core base. Gaps in the base
within a state should be reduced through some type of state limitation on local
jurisdictions. Additionally, this article suggests introducing new common definitions
for the digital economy. Moreover, burdens of multistate compliance should be
limited by having a seller register in one state, then accounting for sales tax collection
duties in this state for all states, like the E.U.’s mini one-stop shop (MOSS) regime,
based on the destination principle. Furthermore, the states could, and should, go
further than the E.U. in their coordination and cooperation. Such coordination could
be accomplished by establishing a multistate clearinghouse to handle the accounts
between states and offset the balance in an efficient and technology-based system.
Third, this article argues for enhancing the role of technology to ensure
accurate and efficient sales tax collection. To match increasing digitization, the role
of tax compliance technologies is rising in the SSUTA, the E.U.’s VAT system, and
worldwide taxation. For example, the SSUTA advances the Certified Automated
System (CAS) by Certified Service Providers (CSP) and the Simplified Electronic
Return (SER). These systems facilitate automatic determination of tax jurisdiction
and tax calculations, followed by filing the returns electronically. The E.U.’s VAT
system enhances electronic registration through the MOSS system to counter
evasions and reduce compliance costs, in addition to electronic invoicing and filing.
Recently, the Gulf Cooperation Council Member States (GCC) introduced a new
system that utilizes blockchain technology to transmit information to
multijurisdictional tax authorities on a real-time basis. Based on these trends, this
article proposes that states adopt and adapt these worldwide tax compliance
technologies for collecting sales taxes efficiently on cross-jurisdictional transactions.
The focus should be on real-time technologies, including blockchain and cloud
computing, to collect the data and the sales tax on transactions immediately. Data
recording technology could minimize sales suppression by immediately recording
transactions, and blockchain technology could ensure the authenticity of those
transactions. Once the system is functioning and gathering data on a real-time basis,
4. See Rifat Azam & Orly Mazur, Cloudy with a Chance of Taxation, 22 FLA. TAX REV. 500 (2019).
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states should apply technologies of big data and machine learning to optimize the
system of taxation. However, the collection and use of transaction data implicates
privacy rights, so states must balance appropriately between privacy and tax
compliance.
Finally, this article suggests assigning data sharing and sales tax collection
roles to payment intermediaries to facilitate accurate and efficient collection of sales
taxes. These intermediaries play a critical role in online transactions and collect
accurate data in real time, which enables them to achieve accurate collection of sales
taxes, as well as VAT—a suggestion proposed in a previous co-authored paper with
Orly Mazur.5 Since most online retail transactions occur while consumers are at their
residency jurisdiction, payment intermediaries can collect data to accurately
determine a consumer’s residency. If the consumption occurs while traveling,
retailers and payment intermediaries would then have enough data points to collect
an accurate tax. It is true that this approach raises some privacy concerns, but the
infringement of privacy is extremely limited, and the tax benefits outweigh the
privacy costs significantly. This is because private companies already collect
location data and sharing the data with state tax authorities would be limited to only
the information necessary to enable collection of substantial amounts of tax revenue.
Some opponents argue that this approach requires substantial investments from
payment intermediaries. However, they do not provide valid and accurate data about
the costs. Even if the costs were accurate, in the long run, these costs are manageable,
and the states could alleviate them to some extent. Moreover, assigning tax
compliance roles to payment intermediaries has been implemented in other contexts,
such as in the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) and Internal Revenue
Code Section 6050W, and it is showing effectiveness and efficiency in tax
collection.6 Further, Congress could, and should, contribute to tax compliance efforts
by implementing these measures in international transactions.
Following this introduction, Part I analyzes the historical development in
jurisprudence from Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue of Illinois to Wayfair. Part
II argues for adopting the state-by-state approach in developing the future of online
taxation post Wayfair. It analyzes in detail the milestones of each state on the post5. See id.
6. See, e.g., Richard J. Harvey, Jr., Offshore Accounts: Insider’s Summary of FATCA and Its
Potential Future, 57 VILL. L. REV. 471 (2012); Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce
the Tax Gap: When Is Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1753-56 (2010);
Jeffrey H. Kahn & Gregg D. Polsky, The End of Cash, the Income Tax, and the Next 100 years, 41 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 159 (2013); JOEL SLEMROD ET AL., DOES CREDIT-CARD INFORMATION REPORTING
IMPROVE SMALL-BUSINESS TAX COMPLIANCE? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., 2015),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w21412 [https://perma.cc/ELQ5-F6VN]; EUROPEAN COMM’N , ANALYSIS
OF THE IMPACT OF THE SPLIT PAYMENT MECHANISM AS AN ALTERNATIVE VAT COLLECTION METHOD
(Deloitte
2017),
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/split_payment_report
_execsummary_2017_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Q2J-V27D]; HM REV. & CUSTOMS, ALTERNATIVE
METHOD OF VAT COLLECTION—SPLIT PAYMENT CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, (Mar. 13, 2018),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/68778
3/Alternative_method_of_VAT_collection___split_payment.pdf [https://perma.cc/TD4B-485B]; HM
REV. & CUSTOMS, ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF VAT COLLECTION—SPLIT PAYMENT SUMMARY OF
RESPONSES, (Nov. 7, 2018), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system
/uploads/attachment_data/file/754209/Alternative_method_of_VAT_collection_summary_of_responses.
pdf [https://perma.cc/WGZ7-H73J].
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Wayfair journey, starting with their policy decisions, then moving forward to how
they designed and structured their legal frameworks and collaborated with other
states in multistate transactions. Finally, Part III sets the basis and framework for
multistate coordination and cooperation and presents the proposals to establish a
multistate clearinghouse. The part elaborates on the rise of tax compliance
technologies and presents the suggestion to use cloud computing and blockchain
technologies, as well as data analysis from payment intermediaries, to enhance sales
tax collection in the digital economy in an accurate, efficient, and constitutional
manner.
I.

FROM BELLAS HESS TO WAYFAIR

The Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”7 Accordingly, the Due Process Clause
“requires some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the
person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.”8 The Commerce Clause in Article I
of the Constitution states, “The Congress shall have power . . . to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the
Indian Tribes.”9 From this positive grant of power to Congress, the U.S. Supreme
Court developed a negative, or dormant, Commerce Clause doctrine, which limits
the powers of states to regulate interstate commerce.10 As Professor Laurence Tribe
put it, “For at least 140 years, the Supreme Court has construed the Commerce
Clause as incorporating an implicit restraint on state power even in the absence of
congressional action—hence the notion of a ‘dormant’ Commerce Clause.”11 The
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence concerns the fairness and efficiency of the
interstate economy. It aims to ban discriminatory and unjustified burdens on
interstate commerce. It tries to ensure the fair apportioning of the tax pie on interstate
commerce.12 Based on these constitutional norms, the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence has defined the states’ power to tax interstate commerce. This section
analyzes the landmark cases from that jurisprudence: Bellas Hess13 to Wayfair.14

7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1332 (Foundation Press, 3rd ed. 2000); JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND
LOCAL TAXATION 353-57 (Thomson/West, 8th ed., 2005).
8. Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-345 (1954).
9. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of Phila., 53 U.S. 299, 321 (1851); Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S.
439, 447 (1991) (“The Commerce Clause does more than confer power on the Federal Government; it is
also a substantive ‘restriction on permissible state regulation’ of interstate commerce.”).
11. TRIBE, supra note 7, at 1030.
12. See, e.g., New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988) (“The Clause’s ‘negative’
aspect, directly limiting the States’ power to discriminate against interstate commerce, prohibits economic
protectionism-that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening
out-of-state competitors.”).
13. Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
14. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S.Ct. 2080 (2018).
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Bellas Hess: Due Process and the Commerce Clause’s Physical Presence
Rule

In Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, the remote mail order
seller National Bellas Hess challenged the constitutionality of Illinois imposing sales
and use tax collection duties on its sales to Illinois consumers. The U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause prohibit a state
from imposing the duty of collecting sales and use tax upon a seller whose only
connection with customers in the state is by common carrier or by mail without any
physical presence in the state. According to the Court, the two clauses share similar
tests and they both require physical presence in the state.15
The majority opinion reasoned that imposing multi-jurisdictional duties of
tax collection would create a substantial burden on interstate commerce, which
violates “the very purpose of the Commerce Clause [which] was to ensure a national
economy free from such unjustifiable local entanglements.”16 According to the
Court:
Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of commercial transactions more
exclusively interstate in character than the mail order transactions
here involved. And if the power of Illinois to impose use tax
burdens upon National were upheld, the resulting impediments
upon the free conduct of its interstate business would be neither
imaginary nor remote. For if Illinois can impose such burdens, so
can every other State, and so, indeed, can every municipality,
every school district, and every other political subdivision
throughout the Nation with power to impose sales and use taxes.17
The dissent, on the other hand, focused on the fact that Bellas Hess
exploited the state consumer market on a systematic, continuous, and large-scale
level which created a sufficient nexus.18 The dissent asserted the following:
To excuse Bellas Hess from [the obligation to collect sales and use
taxes] is to burden and penalize retailers located in Illinois who
must collect the sales tax from their customers. . . . While this
advantage to out-of-state sellers is tolerable and a necessary
constitutional consequence where the sales are occasional . . . it
certainly should not be extended to instances where the out-ofstate company is engaged in exploiting the local market on a
regular, systematic, large-scale basis.19
The dissent’s reasoning and concerns in Bellas Hess are actually similar to
the majority’s reasoning and concerns in Wayfair later on. But the decision in
Wayfair had to wait a few years while the Court first grappled with issues raised in
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc., 386 U.S. at 756.
Id. at 760.
Id. at 759.
Id. at 761–62.
Id. at 763.
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Complete Auto: The Four Prongs Test

Ten years after Bellas Hess, the Supreme Court held in Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady that states may tax out-of-state retailors as long as their tax
meets the four prongs test as follows: “[1] the tax is applied to an activity with a
substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not
discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services
provided by the State.”20 Complete Auto was an auto transporter involved in moving
General Motors vehicles from the railhead at Jackson, Mississippi, to dealerships in
Mississippi. The Mississippi State Tax Commission levied a tax upon Complete
Auto “for the privilege of engaging or continuing in business or doing business” in
the state of Mississippi. Complete Auto argued against the constitutionality of the
tax, stating that it was part of an interstate operation involved in transporting vehicles
from the factories in Michigan to the dealers in Mississippi. According to Complete
Auto, taxation on interstate operations not only discourages interstate commerce but
also is a violation of the Commerce Clause. But the Supreme Court rejected these
arguments based on the four prongs test.
The four prongs test marks a paradigmatic shift from the previous
formalistic approach in cases such as Freeman v. Hewit21 and Spector Motor Serv.,
Inc. v. O’Connor.22 There, state taxes on interstate commerce were struck down
simply because the Dormant Commerce Clause “created an area of trade free from
interference by the States.”23 The Supreme Court in Complete Auto clearly and
explicitly overruled Freeman and Spector.24 As the Supreme Court stated repeatedly,
the new approach to Commerce Clause adjudication in the state tax field has “moved
toward a standard of permissibility of state taxation based upon its actual effect rather
than its legal terminology.”25 The Supreme Court in later cases emphasized that
Commerce Clause challenges to state taxation should be resolved according to the
“practical or economic effect of the tax.”26
Post-Complete Auto jurisprudence refined and detailed the four prongs
test.27 For example, in Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep’t. of Revenue,
Washington State imposed a tax on an out-of-state seller who solicited business in
Washington through an independent contractor located in Seattle.28 The Washington
Supreme Court upheld the tax and ruled that using an active representative in a state,
even an independent one, establishes a substantial nexus as per the first prong. To
use the words of the Washington Supreme Court, “the crucial factor governing nexus
20. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
21. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
22. Spector Motor Serv. v. O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
23. Freeman, 329 U.S. at 252.
24. See William B. Lockhart, A Revolution in State Taxation of Commerce, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1025,
1026 (1980).
25. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 295 (1987).
26. Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 262 (1989).
27. For detailed analysis, see HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 7, at 192–326; Walter
Hellerstein, Michael J. McIntyre, & Richard D. Pomp, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Taxation
after Jefferson Lines, 51 TAX L. REV. 47 (1995); Jesse H. Choper & Tung Yin, State Taxation and the
Dormant Commerce Clause: The Object-Measure Approach, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 193 (1998).
28. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State, Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987).
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is whether the activities performed in this state on behalf of the taxpayer are
significantly associated with the taxpayer’s ability to establish and maintain a market
in this state for the sales.”29
The second prong, fair apportionment, consists of two components.30 First,
it requires that a state tax be “externally consistent,” which means that the tax is
based on factors that “actually reflect a reasonable sense of how income is
generated.”31 The Supreme Court reaffirmed in Goldberg v. Sweet that “the central
purpose behind the apportionment requirement is to ensure that each State taxes only
its fair share of an interstate transaction.”32 The second component of the Court’s
fair-apportionment prong is its “internal consistency” requirement. Evaluating a state
tax for internal consistency requires a court to ask whether a taxpayer would face a
higher tax burden if they engaged in interstate commerce than if they engaged in
intrastate commerce.33
As the name implies, the third prong, non-discrimination, requires
nondiscrimination between taxing intrastate transactions and interstate transactions.
For example, based on this prong, the Supreme Court invalidated discriminatory
taxes that were expressly limited to merchants or products of other states.34 Finally,
the fourth prong, that the tax be fairly related to the services provided by the state, is
very much related to the substantial nexus prong, but it adds the “limitation that the
measure of the tax must be reasonably related to the extent of the contact.”35
In sum, Complete Auto sets the full legal framework on states’ tax
jurisdiction over out-of-state retailers and requires a substantial nexus, among
additional prongs. Substantial nexus was interpreted in Bellas Hess to mean physical
presence in the taxing state. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota later confirmed this rule.
C.

Quill: Commerce Clause and the Physical Presence Rule

The Supreme Court in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota banned states from
imposing sales tax collection duties on out-of-state businesses that do not have a
physical presence in the state because doing so would violate the Commerce Clause,
but not the Due Process Clause.36 The Quill rule reaffirmed Bellas Hess’s strict
physical presence requirement.
The facts of Quill are extremely similar to those in Bella Hess. Quill was a
Delaware corporation without a physical presence in North Dakota. It solicited
business through catalogues, flyers, telephone calls and advertisements in national
periodicals. Its mail-ordered sales in North Dakota amounted to almost one million
29. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 715 P.2d 123, 126 (1986).
30. Thimmesch, supra note 3.
31. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2942 (1983).
32. Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 260–61 (1998).
33. See Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1802 (2015); see also Michael
S. Knoll & Ruth Mason, The Economic Foundation of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 103 VA. L. REV.
309, 312 (2017).
34. See Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U.S. 566 (1878); see also Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 351
(1880).
35. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 626 (1981).
36. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992), overruled by South Dakota v. Wayfair,
Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
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dollars from about three hundred customers. Quill challenged state law requiring it
to collect sales tax from North Dakota customers as an undue burden. The North
Dakota Supreme Court ruled that “wholesale changes” in both the economy and the
law, such as the remarkable growth of the mail order industry and the formal
approach in Commerce Clause analysis being replaced by the flexible economic
effects approach in Complete Auto, made it inappropriate to follow Bellas Hess any
longer.37 Accordingly, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that Quill’s
economic involvement in North Dakota established a sufficient nexus to justify the
collection burden and pass the constitutional challenge. However, the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Quill opened the landmark case by
making a clear distinction between the Due Process Clause and the Commerce
Clause: “The two constitutional requirements differ fundamentally in several
ways . . . [and] reflect different constitutional concerns.”38 As to the Due Process
Clause, the Court ruled that it required some minimum connection between the state
and the person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax. The Court emphasized that
the jurisprudence evolved substantially since Bellas Hess and abandoned formalistic
tests, favoring a flexible economic inquiry into the contacts with the state and their
economic effects.39 Accordingly, the Court concluded that North Dakota’s law did
not violate the Due Process Clause because Quill was engaged in continuous and
widespread solicitation of business within North Dakota.40
As to the Commerce Clause, the Court emphasized that Complete Auto
looked at the practical economic effects of the tax rather than examining formal
language of the tax. However, the Court made clear that Complete Auto had not
“rendered Bellas Hess ‘obsolete.’”41 The Court explained:
While contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not
dictate the same result were the issue to arise for the first time
today, Bellas Hess is not inconsistent with Complete Auto and our
recent cases. . . . Bellas Hess concerns the first of these [four
prong] tests and stands for the proposition that a vendor whose
only contacts with the taxing State are by mail or common carrier
lacks the “substantial nexus” required by the Commerce Clause.42
The Court referred to the continuous validity and confirmation of this
proposition in the field of sales and use taxation, while carefully noting, “we have
not, in our review of other types of taxes, articulated the same physical-presence
requirement that Bellas Hess established for sales and use taxes.”43 This bright line
rule was justified, according to the Court, because it drew the boundaries clearly,

37. State v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 213 (N.D. 1991).
38. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 305 (alteration in original).
39. Id. at 307.
40. Id. at 308; see also Hayes R. Holderness, Taking Tax Due Process Seriously: The Give and Take
of State Taxation, 20 FLA. TAX REV. 371 (2017).
41. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 310.
42. Id. at 311 (alteration in original).
43. Id. at 314 (alteration in original).
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“reduce[d] litigation,” and “foster[ed] investment[s].”44 Finally, the Court relied on
the doctrine and principle of stare decisis to support its opinion, adding that
“Congress has the ultimate power to resolve” the issue.45
The critique of Quill was so intense that a movement to “kill Quill”
emerged.46 Most notably, in March 2015, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote a
concurring opinion in Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl that urged the Court to
revisit Quill’s legal underpinnings.47 The brief by Amici Curiae Law Professors and
Economists in Support of Petitioner in South Dakota v. Wayfair summarized some
of the main arguments against Quill.48 First, the physical presence rule posed a far
greater threat to the fiscal stability of states and local governments than the Quill
Court anticipated. Since Quill, revenue losses from interstate transactions across all
fifty states increased from an estimated $3.27 billion in 1992 to an estimated $33.9
billion in 2018.49 Second, as economic research has demonstrated, Quill’s physical
presence rule distorts consumption decisions of online shoppers, encouraging them
to evade state and local sales and use taxes, which has negative consequences on
economic efficiency.50 Third, the physical presence rule discouraged vendors from
expanding across state lines, which undermined the Dormant Commerce Clause’s
objective of promoting economic union and free interstate commerce.51 Fourth, the
physical presence rule shifted the burden of compliance from vendors to consumers
44. Id. at 315–316 (alteration in original).
45. Id. at 317–318.
46. See eg., Hayes R. Holderness, Questioning Quill, 37 VA. TAX REV. 313, 317 (2018) (“[T]he Quill
Court failed to fully consider: (1) the basis for requiring a connection between the taxing state and the
taxpayer under the Commerce Clause, (2) all of the burdens a state tax action might place on a taxpayer
and the relationship of the taxpayer’s physical presence to those burdens, (3) the nature, regulatory or tax,
of the use tax collection obligations, (4) the substance of those obligations if they are characterized as
taxes, and (5) the full scope of use taxes, particularly in relation to sales taxes.”); Brian Galle, Kill Quill,
Keep the Dormant Commerce Clause: History’s Lessons on Congressional Control of State Taxation, 70
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 158, 158–159 (2017–2018) (arguing that “original historical evidence . . . suggests
that the political economy premises on which Quill rests,” namely that Congress is well equipped to
regulate the issue, “are fundamentally mistaken” because one hundred years of experience proved that
“When there are strong interest groups on both sides, as in the case of Quill, Congress is often paralyzed.”
Nevertheless, the “same evidence should lead the Court to keep in place the larger body of ‘Dormant
Commerce Clause’ jurisprudence.”); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Political Process Argument for Overruling
Quill, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1177, 1180 (2017) (“[T]he Court should overturn Quill in the Court’s role as
guardian of the states against federal commandeering in light of the combination of the relevant factors:
the tactical advantage Quill bestows in the political process upon the Internet and mail-order industries,
the importance of the states in the structure of federalism, the centrality of sales taxes to the financing of
state government, the severe impediment Quill and its physical presence test impose upon the collection
of these taxes, and the unique disadvantages of the states in the federal legislative process.”); Richard D.
Pomp, Revisiting Miller Brothers, Bellas Hess, and Quill, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 1115, 1116, 1145 (2016)
(arguing that Quill is “based on [the] shaky precedent” of Bellas Hess, and that “One fundamental problem
with Quill is that the Court never explained what physical presence in a state has to do with limiting state
burdens on interstate commerce, retreating into bromides about the value of bright lines and how they can
be rough around the edges.”).
47. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
48. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors and Economists in Support of Petitioner, South Dakota v.
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 17-494), 2018 WL 1203458.
49. Id. at *8–9.
50. Id. at *12–13.
51. Id. at *14–16.
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who must pay use tax. This means that consumers must track all their purchases over
the course of a year in order to calculate the tax owed, which increases compliance
costs dramatically and led to noncompliance and tax revenue losses.52
D.

Wayfair: Overruling Quill—Economic and Virtual Contacts

After 25 years, the Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Wayfair overruled
Quill and its physical presence rule.53 Wayfair allows states to impose sales tax
collection duties on out-of-state sellers without a physical presence in the state as
long as they still have a substantial nexus and meet the other prongs of Complete
Auto.
In Wayfair, South Dakota challenged Quill directly by passing an Act that
required out-of-state sellers to collect and remit sales tax “as if the seller had a
physical presence in the state.”54 The Act was limited to sellers who delivered
annually more than $100,000 of goods or services into the state, or engaged in 200
or more separate transactions for the delivery of goods or services into the state.
Pursuant to this Act, South Dakota required Wayfair and other online retailers
without any physical presence, employees, or agents in the state to collect and remit
sales tax because each fulfilled the Act’s threshold requirements. Wayfair challenged
the Act, and as a result, the Supreme Court examined its constitutionality.
Justice Kennedy opened the Court’s opinion by explaining the nowaccepted framework for state taxation under Complete Auto. The Court reaffirmed
that there must be a substantial nexus with the taxing state, but held that “physical
presence is not necessary to create a substantial nexus.”55 The Court concluded that
Quill was flawed on its own terms. According to the Court, the same reasoning given
in Quill for rejecting the physical presence rule for Due Process purposes apply
equally for Commerce Clause purposes.56 The Court acknowledged that the
Commerce Clause was designed to prevent discrimination and unjustified burdens
on interstate commerce.57 However, “the physical presence rule is a poor proxy for
the compliance costs faced by companies that do business in multiple States.”58
Furthermore, the Court noted that Quill’s physical presence rule had become an
anachronism:
Rejecting the physical presence rule is necessary to ensure that
artificial competitive advantages are not created by this Court’s
precedents . . . . When the day-to-day functions of marketing and
distribution in the modern economy are considered, it is all the
more evident that the physical presence rule is artificial in its

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at *17–19.
See generally South Dakota v. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
S.B. 106, 2016 Leg. Assemb., 91st Sess. (S.D. 2016).
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2095.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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entirety. Modern e-commerce does not align analytically with a
test that relies on the sort of physical presence defined in Quill.59
The Court added that the physical presence rule from Quill and Bellas Hess
“is an extraordinary imposition by the Judiciary on States’ authority to collect taxes
and perform critical public functions” and it harmed public trust, principles of
federalism, and free markets.60 The harm was especially obvious after the internet
revolution, leading to estimated tax losses as high as $33 billion.61 Under these
circumstances, with due consideration for reliance interests favoring adherence to
precedent, the Court overruled Quill’s physical presence requirement.62
The Court’s position on precedent differed from the dissenting opinion,
which declined to overrule Bellas Hess and Quill because of the strong policy reasons
for adhering to precedent.63 The dissenting opinion emphasized that the internet
revolution changed the national economy. For that very reason, the dissent argued,
overturning the physical presence rule became a matter of national economic policy
that should be undertaken by Congress, because Congress is better situated to
consider the competing interests at stake. The dissenting opinion added that Congress
was in fact considering the issue, and three bills were pending, but “by suddenly
changing the ground rules, the Court may have waylaid Congress’s consideration of
the issue.”
Once the Court overruled the physical presence rule, it clarified that the
substantial nexus requirement, per the first prong of Complete Auto, is still required.
The Court concluded that the nexus requirement was fulfilled in this case because
Wayfair had sufficient economic and virtual contacts with the State.64 In doing so,
the Court recognized economic and virtual contacts as constituting a substantial
nexus as required by the Commerce Clause.
The Court validated South Dakota’s Act, but it could not examine all
aspects of its validity since the parties did not litigate all those issues. Nevertheless,
the Court mentioned a few features of the Act that reduce burdens, such as safe
harbor for limited transactions in South Dakota; prospective application of the
remittance obligations; and membership and adoption of the Streamlined Sales and
Use Tax Agreement. Consequently, while the Court concluded that South Dakota’s
sales tax law is constitutional, it is likely that other state sales tax laws would be
constitutional as well, so long as they follow the reasonings and guidelines set forth
in Wayfair. Accordingly, states should use the foundation laid in this revolutionary
decision to continue building their sales tax systems.
In its decision, the Wayfair Court referred to Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,65
which held that state regulation of commerce would be upheld unless the burden
imposed on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 2096–2097.
Id. at 2098.
Id. at 2100.
Id. at 2102.
Id. at 2104 (Roberts, C.J. with Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan JJ. dissenting).
Id. at 2099 (majority opinion).
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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benefits.66 The Court noted that this principle animates its Commerce Clause cases
which address the validity of state taxes. However, the Court also referred to
Complete Auto and the four prongs test. Ultimately, the Wayfair Court did not make
a clear decision on the applicability of Pike but at the same time, the Court discussed
the Pike principle as an added protection against undue burdens on interstate
commerce.67
In his fascinating article, Professor Adam Thimmesch analyzed Wayfair
from a doctrinal perspective and called for adopting a unified Dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine in tax and non-tax issues.68 Based on the origin of the Court’s nexus
standard, Professor Thimmesch construed Complete Auto’s substantial nexus
requirement as very close to, if not the same as, that required by the Due Process
Clause. From the Court’s references to other Commerce Clause cases in Wayfair, he
concluded that there “is an apparent two-step process by which state nexus
provisions are subject to analysis first under Complete Auto and then under Pike,”
and that “the Court has suggested that a state law be subject to both the Court’s tax
and nontax tests.”69 Professor Thimmesch argued further, from a normative
perspective, for eliminating the nexus requirement because it does not serve any
function beyond the minimum contacts test of the Due Process Clause. Ultimately,
Professor Thimmesch called for eliminating the Court’s “bifurcated approach to
dormant Commerce Clause adjudication.”70
Alternatively, Professor Walter Hellerstein distinguished between
substantive jurisdiction, which relates to the power of a state to tax the subject matter
of the tax, and enforcement jurisdiction, which relates to the power of a state to
compel collection of the tax.71 He argued that while Wayfair rejected relational
requirement between the two types of jurisdictions as part of the nexus requirement,
the Court “did allude to a constitutional mechanism for requiring such a relationship,
at least in some circumstances—namely, the Commerce Clause balancing
framework of Pike.”72 But Professor Hellerstein concluded that “Despite the Wayfair
Court’s tantalizing suggestion that Pike could potentially protect remote sellers from

66. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080 at 2091.
67. Id. at 2098–99.
68. See Adam B. Thimmesch, The Unified Dormant Commerce Clause, 92 TEMP. L. REV. 331, 366–
78 (2020).
69. Id. at pp. 354–55.
70. Id. at 381. See also Adam Thimmesch, Darien Shanske & David Gamage, Wayfair: Substantial
Nexus and Undue Burden, 89 ST. TAX NOTES 447 (2018); Ruth Mason, Implications of Wayfair, 46
INTERTAX 810, 816 (2018) (“[C]laims about the sufficiency of nexus and whether the state imposes undue
burdens on interstate commerce should be subject to the balancing test established by the Supreme Court
in Pike v. Bruce Church.”).
71. See Walter Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income and Consumption in the New Economy: A
Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 38 GA. L. REV. 1 (2003). See also Walter Hellerstein,
Jurisdiction to Impose and Enforce Income and Consumption Taxes: Towards a Unified Conception of
Tax Nexus, in VALUE ADDED TAX AND DIRECT TAXATION: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 545
(Michael Lang, Peter Melz & Eleanor Kristoffersson eds., 2009).
72. Walter Hellerstein & Andrew Appleby, Substantive and Enforcement Jurisdiction in a PostWayfair World, 2018 ST. TAX NOTES 283.
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overreaching sales and use tax collection obligations, Pike is unlikely to be the
panacea that some have envisaged.”73
I suggest a simple reading of Wayfair that continues the distinction between
Commerce Clause jurisprudence in tax issues and non-tax issues. Wayfair did not
directly confront the doctrinal convergence that applies different tests for purposes
of evaluating state laws that are classified as taxes and those that are not.
Accordingly, in tax issues, the four prongs test of Complete Auto applies, including
the ban on undue burdens. In non-tax issues, the balancing test of Pike applies. In
my opinion, any state tax act that imposes sales and use tax collection duties on outof-state sellers must fulfill the substantial nexus requirement and all tests of
Complete Auto. Wayfair acknowledged that economic and virtual contacts could
establish substantial nexus. Given this understanding of Wayfair, the remainder of
this article focuses on implementing and improving the collection of sales and use
taxes from interstate online transactions in the post-Wayfair era. I propose to follow
a state-by-state approach in building the systems of remote taxation, but, at the same
time to coordinate and cooperate with other states through the Streamlined Sales and
Use Tax Agreement while learning from the European Union’s experience, and
implementing new technologies of online taxation.
II.

THE FUTURE OF ONLINE TAXATION: STATE-BY-STATE
APPROACH

The sales tax is a tax governed by the states, and it should, and probably
will, continue to be so for the basic reason that states are unlikely to give up their
power of taxation. Moreover, each state has different tax needs, so there is no one
tax that fits all states. The evidence since Wayfair supports this argument clearly
because most states responded independently by enacting legislation to implement
Wayfair and rejected any imposition of federal restrictions or regulations.
Furthermore, federal bills from the past reveal the disadvantages states faced in the
process and the shortcomings of federal imposition in this context.
However, the state-by-state approach increases compliance costs and
interstate conflicts. To reduce these costs and alleviate conflicts, a second layer of
multistate cooperation and coordination is needed, in addition to the first layer of
state-by-state taxation. The Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA), if
developed further, is a framework states can use to satisfy that need. This second
layer of multistate cooperation does not contradict or undermine the state-by-state
approach, but instead completes it to produce a comprehensive system of
independence and cooperation. A similar system exists in many fields already, where
municipalities, states, countries, or other jurisdictions, set their own rules
independently, but cooperate to reduce costs and conflicts. An example of this model
is the Multistate Tax Compact, an agreement between and among states with the
facially conflicting goals of promoting uniformity and state autonomy.74 The
73. Id. at 292. See also Edward A. Zelinsky, Comparing Wayfair to Wynne: Lessons for the Future
of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 22 CHAP. L. REV. 55 (2019); Thimmesch et al., supra note 70; Richard
Pomp, Wayfair: Its Implications and Missed Opportunities, 58 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 1 (2019).
74. See Natasha N. Varyani, States Unbound: Examining the Authority of the Multistate Tax Compact
in a Modern, Multijurisdictional Economy, 1 WAYNE ST. U. J. BUS. L. 21 (2018).
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Compact created the Model Apportionment Formula, which allocates the tax pie
between the states to multistate taxpayers, and the Multistate Tax Commission,
which administers the system of coordination.75
The International Fuel Tax Agreement (IFTA) is another example of
interstate tax coordination. Under the IFTA, states have flexibility in their
coordination measures, as long as three core provisions are met: A base jurisdiction
concept, which allows motor carriers to report and pay fuel use taxes to a single
jurisdiction; a uniform definition of a taxpayer for purposes of the fuel tax agreement;
and the state’s retention of its taxing sovereignty to determine tax rates, exemptions,
and to exercise other substantive tax authority. By most measures, the IFTA has been
a successful model in interstate coordination76 International taxation is another
example of interjurisdictional coordination and cooperation, where each country sets
its own international tax rules but cooperates in bilateral tax treaties to reduce
conflicts created by double taxation (by exchanging tax information automatically,
for example) and reduce tax evasion.
Despite independent state needs, the multistate coordination and
cooperation within the second layer of state-by-state taxation necessitates some tax
consistency, to some extent, to reduce costs and conflicts. However, a multistate
agreement is preferred over federal imposition because it is based on consent, and
each state could decide whether to join the second layer or not. In addition, any level
of required consistency is balanced out by the wide range of discretion each State
can have under an agreement, while federal imposition is unlikely to allow for such
discretion. Under the preferred regime, the systems of taxation are streamlined,
rather than unified. The issue of uniformity in state taxation is extremely sensitive
and complex. Throughout the history of state taxation, in many contexts the basic
concern has been to balance states’ sovereignty and power to tax against compliance
burdens and multistate conflicts.77 Federal imposition does not achieve this delicate
balance, but state-by-state taxation along with a multistate agreement such as the
SSUTA could do so. On this hybrid regime of state and multistate layers, I will
elaborate in this chapter.
A.

States’ Policy Decisions

Once Wayfair removed the constitutional ban on state tax collection without
physical presence, it opened the door for collecting taxes on out-of-state online
transactions. However, it is important to understand that each state should first make
a policy decision that such tax collection is appropriate for that state in terms of

75. See Walter Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations: Reflections
on Mobil, Exxon, and H.R. 5076, 79 MICH. L. REV. 113 (1980); W. BARTLEY HILDRETH, MATTHEW N.
MURRAY & DAVID L. SJOQUIST, COOPERATION OR COMPETITION: THE MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION
AND STATE CORPORATE TAX UNIFORMITY (2005).
76. See Dwight Denison & Rex L. Facer II, Interstate Tax Coordination: Lessons from the
International Fuel Tax Agreement, 58 NAT’L TAX J. 591 (2005).
77. See W. Bartley Hildreth, Matthew N. Murray & David L. Sjoquist, Interstate Tax Uniformity and
the Multistate Tax Commission, 58 NAT’L TAX J. 575 (2005); Jerry Sharpe, State Taxation of Interstate
Businesses and the Multistate Tax Compact: The Search for a Delicate Uniformity, 11 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 231 (1975).
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revenue, economics, and fairness. Since Wayfair, most states already decided to
impose sales tax on out-of-state online transactions.78
In terms of revenue, obviously e-commerce retail is growing and along with
it the potential for greater sales tax revenue. In 2016, sales from e-commerce for U.S.
retailers “were $389.1 billion, up 14.4 percent from a revised $340.2 billion in
2015. . . . E-commerce sales were 8.0 percent of total sales in 2016, up from a revised
7.2 percent in 2015.”79 “In 2017, e-commerce sales accounted for 9.0 percent of all
retail sales in the United States, which is expected to reach 12.4% in 2020.”80 “In
2019, U.S. online retail sales of physical goods amounted to [$]343.15 billion . . .
and are projected to reach close to [$]476.5 billion . . . in 2024.”81
The Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce announced
recently that the estimate of U.S. retail e-commerce sales for the
third quarter of 2019, adjusted for seasonal variation, but not for
price changes, was $154.5 billion, an increase of 5.0 percent
(±0.4%) from the second quarter of 2019. Total retail sales for the
third quarter of 2019 were estimated at $1,380.5 billion, an
increase of 1.4 percent (±0.2%) from the second quarter of 2019.
The third quarter of 2019 e-commerce estimate increased 16.9
percent (±1.4%) from the third quarter of 2018 while total retail
sales increased 4.0 percent (±0.4%) in the same period. Ecommerce sales in the third quarter of 2019 accounted for 11.2
percent of total sales.82
However, it is not clear which share of e-commerce is already taxed and
which share would be taxed post Wayfair. In addition, the allocation of tax revenue
between the states is complex.83 Despite the challenges of measuring and estimating
78. See Jared Walczak & Janelle Cammenga, State Sales Taxes in the Post-Wayfair Era, TAX FOUND.
(Dec. 12, 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/state-remote-sales-tax-collection-wayfair/ [https://
perma.cc/9N74-DF7U].
79. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, E-STATS 2016: MEASURING THE ELECTRONIC ECONOMY 2 (2018),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2018/econ/e16-estats.pdf
[https://perma.cc/24KK-4K3V].
80. J. Clement, E-commerce share of total retail sales in United States from 2013 to 2021, STATISTA
(July 23, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/379112/e-commerce-share-of-retail-sales-in-us/
[https://perma.cc/8GRP-Z3KB].
81. J. Clement, Retail e-commerce sales in the United States from 2017 to 2024, STATISTA (Aug. 10,
2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/272391/us-retail-e-commerce-sales-forecast/ [https://perma.cc/
ULU7-NQY7].
82. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, CB19-170, Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales: 3rd Quarter 2019,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS, Nov. 2019 at 1, https://www2.census.gov/retail/releases/historical
/ecomm/19q3.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6NC-U6YB].
83. See GEORGE V. VOINOVICH & BOB GRAHAM, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., SALES TAXES:
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE GROWTH PRESENTS CHALLENGES; REVENUE LOSSES ARE UNCERTAIN 3‒4
(2000), https://www.gao.gov/assets/240/230474.pdf [https://perma.cc/6M7S-VLRT] (describing that the
year 2000 internet sales tax loss, evaluated with little data of unknown certainty, is less than two percent
of general sales tax revenues and, even with better data, the rapidly changing e-commerce climate will
result in a future policymaking “environment of significant uncertainty”); Donald Bruce et al., State and
Local Government Sales Tax Revenue Losses from Electronic Commerce, STATE TAX NOTES
(May 19, 2009), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-state/sales-and-use-taxation/state-and-localsales-tax-revenue-losses-e-commerce/2009/05/19/3cd6?highlight=volume%2052
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potential revenue upon tax collection, it is fair to conclude that tax collection post
Wayfair would increase states’ revenue, but each state should make its own in-depth
calculations.84
The economic effects of Quill’s non-collection and post-Wayfair collection
are complex. On one hand, Quill’s disparity in tax treatment causes distortions in
consumer behavior as they might choose online purchases for tax reasons. The
disparity also distorts seller behavior in locating headquarters, plants, and employees
to avoid nexus with a state.85 State sales taxes with fewer loopholes and lower rates
are more neutral and efficient because decisions and behaviors are made based on
economic considerations rather than tax considerations. The additional revenue from
retail sales tax on e-commerce would reduce the rates of far more burdensome taxes,
such as states’ income taxation. This more efficient system, in turn, would increase
Gross State Product (GSP), employment rates, and overall state prosperity.86
According to a study conducted by Arthur Laffer and Donna Arduin, this wiser usage
of additional revenue would, for example, add $34.9 billion to Florida’s GSP and
107,474 jobs by 2022, and add $9.8 billion to Virginia’s GSP and 23,582 jobs by
2022.87
On the other hand, scholars have argued that criticisms of Quill rely on
flawed arguments because online retail is not to blame for any decline in local retail.
In their view, a tax on online retailers would actually have very little effect on overall
state revenues because online retail constitutes such a low share of total retail, and
almost 80 percent of it is already being taxed in other ways.88 Ike Brannon and others
argued that post-Wayfair tax collection would be a discriminatory tariff that would
harm small and micro enterprises, along with the U.S. economy.89 In their deep
analysis, Brannon et al. opened by describing the reality as “brick-and-click.”
Namely, “large, technology-enabled retailers with local presence and capabilities in
numerous locations dominate the market combined with an ‘omnichannel’ strategy
[https://perma.cc/P893-VF6A] (noting that the lost state tax revenue estimates relate to e-commerce only,
while the losses associated with all remote commerce is beyond the scope of the study).
84. See William Fox, Enda Hargaden, & LeAnn Luna, Statutory Incidence and Sales Tax
Compliance:
Evidence from Wayfair 1 (2019)
(unpublished
article) https://ntanet.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/02/William-Fox-Session1477_Paper3088_FullPaper_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/28QQ-FJ76] (“Initial estimates using a difference-in-differences identification strategy
with a novel, hand-collected dataset of monthly tax revenues at the state-level show shifting the statutory
burdens to firms increases tax revenue by 5.4%.”); JOHN MIKESELL & JUSTIN ROSS, AFTER WAYFAIR:
WHAT ARE STATE USE TAXES WORTH? (2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=33
97342 [https://perma.cc/5LVA-KH3F] (“We . . . present a unique monthly series of remote vendor use
tax collections for Indiana before and after Wayfair ruling and using the synthetic control method to derive
a treatment effect of the policy change. While remote vendor registrations have tripled, there has been
relatively modest impact on state revenue.”).
85. See Liran Einav et al., Sales Taxes and Internet Commerce, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 25 (2014).
86. See ARTHUR B. LAFFER & DONNA ARDUIN, PRO-GROWTH TAX REFORM AND EFAIRNESS 1 (2013), http://media.mlive.com/businessreview/western_impact/other/ArtLafferStudy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7KZ5-ZPWR].
87. Id. at 1‒2 tbl.1.
88. See IKE BRANNON ET AL., INTERNET SALES TAXES AND THE DISCRIMINATORY BURDEN ON
REMOTE RETAILERS – AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 31‒32 (2018), https://capitalpolicyanalytics.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/09/SSRN-id3140948.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LQH-RT89].
89. Id. at 3‒4.
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that combines online, mobile, and physical sales channels,”90 which leaves small,
remote retailers at a disadvantage from the stiff competition. Hence, the author’s
argued, “The imposition of a sales tax on online sales would further harm these small
retailers, preventing them from effectively competing against the large local megaretailers that dominate the retail industry today.”91 They concluded that post-Wayfair
taxation would harm the U.S. economy because small businesses would exit the
market, which would reduce competition, employment, innovation, and consumer
choice.92 The authors referred to national estimates of remote sales tax revenues that
showed only an $8.5 billion gain, while risking 355,000 new e-commerce jobs
created between 2007–2016, and more than 710,000 small and micro e-commerce
retailers who might stop doing business as a result of remote taxation.
The fairness argument for post-Wayfair tax collection is straightforward.93
Fairness requires leveling the playing field so that all sellers, online and offline, out
of state and in state, collect the retail sales tax that is due according to the law. It is
unfair to grant a de facto exemption from the duty to collect to any group of sellers.
Accordingly, the National Governors Association praised the Wayfair decision.94 As
the National Conference of State Legislators president, Senator Deb Peters, who
authored South Dakota’s remote sales tax legislation, put it:
Today’s decision by the U.S. Supreme Court is a victory for Main
Street America. Brick and mortar stores will no longer be
penalized for collecting the tax revenues that fund our schools,
infrastructure, and the vital public services that state and local
governments provide. For states, today is just the beginning.
We’ve waited 26 years. Good tax administration is good public
policy and state officials look forward to working with all
stakeholders in the coming months as we move forward to level
the playing field for all of our nation’s retailers.95
It might be that the collection duties would be unfair in terms of comparison
between different sizes of businesses. But I suggest that tax thresholds would
alleviate this to some extent, and the main fairness argument in support of tax
collection would prevail.
In my opinion, states should collect sales tax from online retailers, but they
should design the thresholds and scope of the duty to collect appropriately. For these
reasons, and because the economic effects on each state will be different, it is
90. Id. at 6.
91. Id. at 15.
92. Id. at 36.
93. See Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, Collecting E-commerce Taxes: E-Fairness Legislation,
NCSL (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/collecting-ecommerce-taxes-aninteractive-map.aspx [https://perma.cc/8B65-KCXD]; Nat’l Retail Fed’n, Sales Tax Fairness, NRF,
https://nrf.com/on-the-hill/policy-issues/sales-tax-fairness [https://perma.cc/Z77H-6AEM].
94. Nat’l Governors Ass’n, NGA Statement on Supreme Court Ruling in South Dakota v. Wayfair,
NGA (June 21, 2018), https://www.nga.org/news/press-releases/nga-statement-on-supreme-court-rulingin-south-dakota-v-wayfair/ [https://perma.cc/B35H-EDNP].
95. Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, NCSL Applauds Ruling in Remote Sales Tax Case, NCSL (June
21,
2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/press-room/ncsl-statement-on-wayfair-v-south-dakota-ruling.aspx
[https://perma.cc/3SE8-SN57].
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important for each state to conduct an in-depth analysis to design the most
appropriate collection regime. States’ retail associations have done such studies in
the past. 96 However, I recommend that states and their revenue departments conduct
new studies and consider new circumstances and data. In addition, I recommend
studying the costs of compliance for different sizes of sellers in order to design the
most appropriate tax threshold while alleviating burdens on smaller retailers. Finally,
and most importantly, states should work together to develop a multistate layer of
cooperation and coordination.

96. See Dave Grogan, Massachusetts Study Finds Online Loophole Costs Jobs, Sales, and Revenue,
ABA (Nov. 14, 2012), http://archivenews.bookweb.org/news/massachusetts-study-finds-online-loopholecosts-jobs-sales-and-revenue.html [https://perma.cc/2TVW-8QE7] (estimating that Massachusetts would
have collected in 2011 additional US$387 million sales taxes from e-commerce and mail order sellers,
while US$155 Million from business to business (B2B) sales, US$132 million from business to customers
(B2C) sales, and US$100 million from non e-commerce mail order sales. In 2020 the additional RST
revenues would rise to US$783 million, with US$262 million of that total due to B2B sales, US$374
million from B2C sales and US$148 million from mail order sales. The study assumes that 10.1 percent
of online and ecommerce purchases for which no Massachusetts sales tax is currently collected will shift
to New Hampshire – which has no sales tax – if online internet and other vendors that do not collect the
tax are required to do so. The study estimates that sales of traditional brick and mortar retailers would
have in aggregate increased by US$279 million if the disparity had been eliminated in 2011, and expected
increase of US$587 million in 2020. Using IMPLAN, a well-regarded economic impact modeling system,
the study argues that the impact of additional brick and mortar sales would be 1,534 new retail jobs and
another 478 added jobs across the State economy in 2011. These figures are expected to rise in 2020 to
3,232 new retail jobs and 521 new jobs across the State economy.). See also Robert A. Robicheaux,
Estimates of Alabama Losses Due to E-commerce, ALABAMA RETAIL (2012),
https://alabamaretail.org/wp-content/uploads/EstimatesofAlabamaLossesDuetoE-Commerce.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q6FG-SHG9] (noting that in 2011 online sales by remote sellers to customers in
Alabama exceeded US$34 billion. Most of those sales ($32 Billion) are B2B, which is mostly exempted
(87%) and the taxable (13%) is highly compliant (75–80%). But, most of the retail online sales ($2.3
billion, about 5% of total retail) is mostly taxable, however the tax compliance rate is only about 50%
according to one estimate and about 55% according to a second estimate. Consequently, Alabama is losing
in online sales about $165 million retail sales tax revenues in 2011 which were expected to rise to $186
million in 2016 with conservative growth rate of only 2-2.5% in both B2B and B2C e-commerce and
reach the amount of $232 million with a sustained B2C growth forecast. “Alabamians purchases from out
of state sellers are benefiting other states including California, Florida, New York, Texas, Illinois,
Colorado, Pennsylvania and Washington, where a disproportionate number of e-commerce sellers
operate” (more than 52%), and are hurting Alabama economy by reducing Alabama GSP, employment,
household income, and tax revenues.); see also Economic Analysis of Tax Revenue from E-commerce in
Ohio, ECON. CTR (2011), https://drive.google.com/file/d/0ByXZnu2dn5HaMWRhZmQ0Mzc
tMWJjNi00ZThiLWJmZmYtZmQwNzc0NmVlYmYw/view [https://perma.cc/7QJV-5VDD]; Michigan
Sales Tax Collection and the Internet: A Need for Fairness, PUBLIC SECTOR CONSULTANTS (2011),
https://publicsectorconsultants.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Final-report-Internet-sales-tax.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WKT5-EAS5]; Nancy Mantell, Joseph J. Seneca, Michael L. Lahr, & Will Irving,
Estimates of New Jersey Sales and Use Tax Losses Resulting From E-commerce (2011),
http://www.efairness.org/pdf/New-Jersey-Sales.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RRT-BZRQ]; Ying Huang, John
Kosash & Andrew Wesemann, (2012), Internet Sales and Use Tax Issues in Missouri, MISSOURI
LEGISLATIVE ACADEMY (2012) https://truman.missouri.edu/sites/default/files/publication/internet-salesand-use%20tax-issues-in-missouri.pdf [https://perma.cc/YK8D-HDGA] .
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States’ Legal Frameworks

Once a state decides to collect sales taxes from out-of-state online sellers,
it should design legal frameworks to govern those collection burdens and boundaries.
Before Wayfair, states had already tried several models of taxation, such as the
affiliate nexus model and the reporting model.97 Following the decision in Wayfair,
states have rushed to copy South Dakota’s law, which adopted the economic nexus
model.98 Since Wayfair, 43 of 45 states with statewide sales taxes have adopted
collection and remittance obligations for remote sellers, and 38 have implemented
marketplace facilitator regimes.99 In this section, I argue that both as a constitutional
matter and as a policy matter, states should follow the economic nexus model. I call
states to enact new legal frameworks to implement the model, simplify the tax
regime, and minimize compliance costs in the state and among the states.
There are numerous examples of new state legislation that imposes
collection duties on remote sellers which meet certain thresholds. Upon the
97. According to the affiliate model, an out of state retailer would be considered to have a substantial
nexus in the state if he conducts business in the state through an affiliate. The reporting model imposes
reporting duties on out of state sellers to enable the collection of the tax from the consumers. See Nat’l
Conf. of State Legislatures, State Activity for Remote Sales Tax Collection, NCSL (June 6, 2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/e-fairness-legislation-overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/4EP2EK6S]; see also Sales Tax Inst., Remote Sellers Nexus Chart, SALES TAX INST. (July 1, 2020),
https://www.salestaxinstitute.com/resources/remote-seller-nexus-chart [https://perma.cc/J3QY-ZKQH];
Joseph Bishop Henchman, 31 States Tax Internet Sellers Without Physical Presence; Congress Considers
(Mar.
2018),
Action
Before
Wayfair
Expands
it
to
All,
TAX FOUNDATION
https://files.taxfoundation.org/20180412152356/Tax-Foundation-FF579.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M4JFR7E4]; Andrew J. Haile, Affiliate Nexus in E-commerce, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1803 (2012). Other States
have enacted affiliate nexus laws, including, for example, New Jersey, Virginia, Missouri, and New York.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. §54:32B-2(i)(1) (West, Westlaw through L. 2020, c.67); see also N.J. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY,
NEXUS
FOR
SALES
AND
USE
TAX,
(Aug.
2015),
https://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation/pdf/pubs/tb/tb78r.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ENJ-ZAXS]. See also
VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-612 (2020); see also, MO. REV. STAT. § 144.605 (West, Westlaw through West
ID No. 25 of the 2020 Second Reg. Sess.); N.Y. TAX LAW §1101(b)(8)(vi) (McKinney 2019); N.Y. STATE
DEP’T OF TAX’N & FIN. OFF. OF TAX POLY’ ANALYSIS, SUMMARY OF TAX PROVISIONS IN SFY 2008–09
BUDGET,
(Apr.
2008),
https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/stats/sumprovisions/summary_of_2008_09_
tax_provisions.pdf [https://perma.cc/23XU-3BXY]; N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAX’N & FIN. OFF. OF TAX
POL’Y ANALYSIS TAXPAYER GUIDANCE DIV., TSB-M-08(3)S, NEW PRESUMPTION APPLICABLE TO
DEFINITION OF SALES TAX VENDOR (2008), https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/memos/sales/m08_3s.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DHS3-2T8R].
98. See Ryan Prete, State Group Advises Lengthy Pause Before Collecting Online Sales Tax,
BLOOMBERG LAW (July 2, 2018) https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report-state/state-groupadvises-lengthy-pause-before-collecting-online-sales-tax [https://perma.cc/2DQB-E5RP].
99. See Jared Walczak & Janelle Cammenga, States Sales Taxes in the Post-Wayfair Era, TAX
FOUNDATION (Dec. 2019), https://files.taxfoundation.org/20191212152919/State-Sales-Taxes-in-thePost-Wayfair-Era-PDF..pdf [https://perma.cc/MTE8-VL3X]; see also Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures,
Remote Sales Tax Collection, NCSL (June 6, 2018) http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/e-fairnesslegislation-overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/7V2A-C4PU]; AVALARA, WHAT THE SOUTH DAKOTA V.
WAYFAIR, INC. DECISION MAY MEAN FOR YOUR BUSINESS, https://www.avalara.com
/dam/avalara/public/documents/pdf/Understanding-Economic-Nexus.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MEG9SQES]; Wayfair Chart 2018-09-10 Draft, STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BOARD (2018),
https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/docs/default-source/comm-slac-documents/slac-2018/wayfairchart-2018-9-10--draftc1248dfe52484bd38d59c03919a36b5d.pdf?sfvrsn=cd6bf737_4
[https://perma.cc/5MZR-G5UJ].
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publication of Wayfair, North Dakota’s nexus law from 2017, which is very similar
to South Dakota’s law, became effective.100 Virginia has enacted economic nexus
provisions for remote sellers and marketplace facilitators, effective July 1st, 2019,
with the threshold of $100,000 in total sales, or 200 or more separate retail sales
transactions.101 California began enforcing its economic nexus provisions in 2019
with the threshold set at $500,000.102 Remote sellers that exceed Texas’s $500,000
threshold will be required to collect and remit sales tax, effective January 1st, 2019,
and enforced starting October 1st, 2019.103 Arkansas has also enacted economic and
marketplace nexus legislation, effective July 1st, 2019. Remote sellers and
marketplace facilitators that sell or facilitate the sale of tangible personal property,
taxable services, digital codes, or specified digital products into Arkansas are
required to collect and remit sales and use tax if, in the previous or current calendar
year, the remote seller or marketplace facilitator had $100,000 in aggregate sales, or
at least 200 transactions.104
Marketplace facilitator legislation is springing up in state after state in the
post-Wayfair era.105 For instance, Indiana’s legislation, effective July 1st, 2019, is
informative. Per the legislation, a “marketplace facilitator” is a person, or affiliate of
a person, who owns, operates, or otherwise controls a marketplace and facilitates
retail transactions. It does not include a payment processor business that is appointed
by a merchant to handle payment transactions from various channels and whose sole
activity with respect to marketplace sales is to handle payment transactions between
two parties. A marketplace facilitator is required to collect Indiana sales tax if the
facilitator meets Indiana’s economic nexus threshold of $100,000 or at least 200
transactions, even if the retailer does not meet that threshold.106 New York imposed
collection obligations on marketplace facilitators if they have total gross receipts of
100. S.B. 2298, 65th Leg. Assemb. (N.D. 2017). See generally H.B. 487, 2018 Reg Sess. (Ky. 2018);
Ky. Dep’t of Revenue, Kentucky Sales and Use Tax Collections by Remote Retailers – U.S. Supreme
Court Ruling (July 2018), https://revenue.ky.gov/News/Pages/Kentucky-Sales-and-Use-Tax-Collectionsby-Remote-Retailers-U.S.-Supreme-Court-Ruling.aspx [https://perma.cc/H97U-X2RS]. Very similar
laws with similar thresholds were enacted by several states including Wyoming and Kentucky. See, e.g.,
H.B. 19, 64th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 2017).
101. Sales Tax Institute, Virginia Enacts Economic Nexus Provision for Remote Sellers, SALES TAX
INSTITUTE (Mar. 28, 2019) https://www.salestaxinstitute.com/resources/virginia-enacts-economic-nexusprovisions-for-remote-sellers [https://perma.cc/TL5K-6S22].
102. Sales Tax Inst., California to Enforce Remote Seller Tax Collection Requirements, SALES TAX
INSTITUTE (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.salestaxinstitute.com/resources/california-to-enforce-remoteseller-tax-collection-requirements [https://perma.cc/3KDP-9BZZ].
103. Sales Tax Inst., Texas Amends Rules for Remote Sellers to Establish Economic NEXUS, SALES
TAX INSTITUTE (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.salestaxinstitute.com/resources/texas-amends-rules-forremote-sellers-to-establish-economic-nexus [https://perma.cc/7P7Q-EMSV].
104. Sales Tax Inst., Arkansas Enacts Economic and Marketplace Nexus Legislation, SALES TAX
INSTITUTE (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.salestaxinstitute.com/resources/arkansas-enacts-economic-andmarketplace-nexus-legislation [https://perma.cc/F3ZZ-T32E].
105. Cf. S.B. 126, 2020 Leg., (Fla. 2020). Florida is one of the few, and the most populous of states
that have not passed legislation yet, but Senator Jow Gruters pre-filed S.B. 126 for the 2020 session, which
would require collection by out-of-state sellers with annual sales of more than $100,000 or at least 200
separate transactions into Florida. Id.
106. Sales Tax Inst., Indiana Enacts Marketplace Nexus Legislation, SALES TAX INSTITUTE (May 16,
2019),
https://www.salestaxinstitute.com/resources/indiana-enacts-marketplace-nexus-legislation
[https://perma.cc/Q9C7-G9HH].
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sales made, or facilitated, exceeding $500,000, or if they have made or facilitated
more than 100 sales of property delivered in New York.107 In California, effective
October 1st, 2019, a marketplace facilitator is considered both the seller and retailer
for each sale facilitated through its marketplace, and it must collect sales tax if it
meets the threshold of $500,000.108 The marketplace facilitator threshold in Colorado
is $100,000 and the facilitator must include all sales made by marketplace sellers in,
and through, its marketplace towards the threshold. A marketplace seller shall not
include any sales made in or through a marketplace facilitator’s marketplace towards
the seller’s individual threshold109 In Alabama, marketplace facilitators who meet its
threshold must collect sales taxes, or report such retail sales, and provide customer
notifications.110
In making these laws, states must account for at least two different sets of
considerations: Constitutional limitations, and policy considerations. First, as to the
constitutional limitations, it is true that Wayfair removed the total ban on states
imposing collection duties on out-of-state sellers. But it did not remove constitutional
limitations on those collection duties. Any state legislation must fulfill both the Due
Process Clause and Dormant Commerce Clause. In my understanding of Wayfair,
discussed in Part I.D, to satisfy the Due Process Clause a seller must have minimum
contacts with the state. And to satisfy the Dormant Commerce Clause a state’s
legislation must meet Complete Auto’s four prongs test. Obviously, from the
language of Wayfair, the Supreme Court did not define positively what constitutes
“substantial nexus,” but it acknowledged that economic and virtual contacts can be
sufficient to establish a substantial nexus, confirming that South Dakota’s legislation
fulfilled this new interpretation of the Commerce Clause. In my opinion, these are
strong guidelines for any future state legislation, despite some uncertainty.111 In fact,
since Wayfair, most states have indeed followed these guidelines in legislating new
sales tax laws.
Professor Hayes Holderness wrote about the Dormant Commerce Clause
post Wayfair and derived standards and boundaries for the doctrine based on his
analysis. He developed the “compliance burden” theory, which emphasizes that the
main purpose of substantial nexus is to protect interstate commerce from undue
burdens, and therefore, states must consider all tax compliance burdens resulting
from tax rates, tax bases, and other compliance burdens. Based on that, he concluded,
107. Sales Tax Inst., New York Enacts Marketplace Nexus Provisions, SALES TAX INSTITUTE (Apr.
30, 2019), https://www.salestaxinstitute.com/resources/new-york-enacts-marketplace-nexus-provisions
[https://perma.cc/NB3V-9CZQ].
108. Sales Tax Inst., California Enacts Marketplace Nexus Provisions, Changes Economic Nexus
Threshold, SALES TAX INSTITUTE (Apr. 30, 2019) https://www.salestaxinstitute.com/resources/californiaenacts-marketplace-nexus-provisions-changes-economic-nexus-threshold
[https://perma.cc/3UHGGBSP].
109. Sales Tax Inst., Colorado Codifies Economic Nexus Rule and Enacts Marketplace Nexus
Legislation, SALES TAX INSTITUTE (June 17, 2019), https://www.salestaxinstitute.com
/resources/colorado-codifies-economic-nexus-rule-and-enacts-marketplace-nexus-legislation
[https://perma.cc/62ML-QEJL].
110. Sales Tax Inst., Alabama Enacts Marketplace Nexus Provisions, SALES TAX INSTITUTE (May 13,
2018),
https://www.salestaxinstitute.com/resources/alabama-enacts-marketplace-nexus-provisions
[https:// perma.cc/2DHR-A8LJ].
111. See Thimmesch et al., supra note 70, at 447.
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“Properly understood, the dormant Commerce Clause nexus requirement simply
carves out an amount of interstate activity that may cross a state’s line and not be
subject to the state’s taxing power: that amount of interstate activity that would not
continue if the taxpayer were made to bear the costs of tax compliance.”112 This
standard—compelling someone to avoid doing interstate business with the state—is
a very narrow standard which most legislation would meet.
Accordingly, it seems that most economic nexus legislation since Wayfair
meets Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause requirements. However,
legislation mandating that marketplace facilitators collect sales tax presents a
different, harder constitutional question. I observe two main difficulties in the
marketplace nexus legislation: First, the legislation examines the threshold
according to the sales of the marketplace, rather than the sales of individual remote
sellers. This is very different from Wayfair and it might lead to collecting the taxes
from small remote sellers just because they sell through a popular marketplace that
meets a state’s thresholds. Second, in most marketplace legislation, the threshold is
similar to the economic nexus threshold for individual remote sellers, which means
that the collection burdens would apply for small marketplaces that do not really
have a substantial presence in the state, but a cumulative presence from many small
remote sellers.
My colleague, Professor Hayes, believes that, “Given the loosening of the
personal nexus standard in Wayfair, these marketplace collection laws may pass
constitutional muster, but they should not be guaranteed success given the
compliance costs they will place on the marketplaces.”113 In my opinion, to
strengthen the constitutionality of marketplace nexus legislation, these laws must
define a different threshold for marketplace facilitators which is significantly higher
than the individual remote seller threshold. In addition, it might be helpful to provide
an exemption for vendors who have small out-of-state sales, as long as they notify
the marketplace and provide it with reliable evidence that their out-of-state sales are
below the exemption threshold ($30,000, for example).
Second, as to the policy considerations, economic efficiency is likely to
influence the boundaries of compliance burdens and justify simplification
measures.114 The burdens of compliance are an important consideration that would
influence the states’ legal frameworks regarding both constitutional limits and
economic policy considerations. It is not efficient to impose high burdens to collect
small amounts of revenue. It is not wise, or fair, to unduly burden small remote
sellers. For these reasons, states should (and most of them already have after
Wayfair) define appropriate thresholds which subject remote sellers to collection
burdens only when those thresholds are met.

112. Holderness, supra note 3, at 44.
113. Id. at 47. See also Adam B. Thimmesch, Darien Shanske, & David Gamage,Wayfair:
Marketplaces and Foreign Vendors, STATE TAX NOTES, Oct. 8, 2018, at 18; Jaye Calhoun & William J.
Kolarik II, Implications of the Supreme Court’s Historic Decision in Wayfair, STATE TAX NOTES, July 9,
2018, at 125.
114. See Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, Principles of State Implementation after South Dakota v.
Wayfair, NCSL (June 29, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/taskforces/SALT_SD_vs_ Wayfair.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6YRW-XNFD].
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South Dakota’s threshold was annual sales of at least $100,000 or 200
transactions into the state. The South Dakota threshold is constitutional, but it may
not be appropriate for another state in terms of policy. Obviously, the Supreme
Court’s confirmation of South Dakota’s threshold does not mean that all states must
follow exactly the same threshold, as several states did in a “copy/paste” process.
Instead, each state should deeply consider their threshold, define that threshold in its
new legislation, and minimize compliance burdens—something a few states have
done recently. South Dakota’s law minimized compliance burdens by requiring
uniformity between state and local sales tax bases, minimizing the number of sales
tax rates, and limiting exemptions and special rates. I do not think that these specific
minimization measures in South Dakota’s law are a mandatory check list. The
important point is minimizing burdens, so each state should, and could, design its
minimization measures while learning from South Dakota’s measures.115
Marketplace facilitator legislation, enacted in several states post Wayfair either as
collecting duties or reporting duties, is part of these simplification measures because
one central place accounts for the tax instead of several retailers. This regime also
enhances tax collection effectively. However, it also adds complexity because it is
an additional nexus requirement to the economic nexus. Nevertheless, considering
its efficiency, marketplace nexus is recommended to collect sales taxes on a level
playing field from all businesses.
In sum, enacting an economic nexus law and defining appropriate
thresholds for a state is the first layer of designing appropriate legal frameworks to
address the issue of collecting sales taxes post Wayfair. This layer should also
include marketplace nexus legislation so long as it meets constitutional requirements.
Since Wayfair, most states completed the first layer using that case’s guidelines and
recommendations. However, states should enact a second layer of norms to simplify
the regime, reduce costs, enhance compliance, and advance multistate cooperation.
Multistate cooperation in the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement and
technologies of tax compliance are the foundations of the second layer. In designing
the second layer, the European Union’s value added tax system can, and should, be
used as a valuable model.
C.

Multistate Cooperation & Coordination

Multistate cooperation and coordination are required to minimize conflicts
and costs. States have already made substantial progress in coordination and
cooperation through the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA). This
platform is a worthy starting point and it is appropriate to continue to use, and
improve, for the future of online taxation post Wayfair.
1.

The Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement

The SSUTA is a remarkable reform of sales taxation that has created a
mechanism for multistate coordination. The SSUTA was adopted in November,
115. See Joseph Bishop Henchman et al., Post Wayfair Options for States, TAX FOUNDATION (August
29, 2018), https://files.taxfoundation.org/20180904165435/Tax-Foundation-FF6091.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4U78-93W6] /.
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2002, and amended through December, 2018. It is a multi-state agreement that laid
a groundwork for unification and simplification of sales and use tax laws among the
states116 The Governing Board of the Streamlined Sales Tax Organization consists
of representatives from each of the member states and it governs the administration
and operation of the SSUTA, regulating states’ compliance with the agreement.117
The rise of e-commerce contributed to the formation and development of the
SSUTA. Technology and other factors influenced states’ decisions to join the
SSUTA.118
The historical development of the SSUTA supports the preference for
multistate coordination over federal imposition to cope with the challenges of remote
sales in an era of internet sales and digitalization.119 The Streamlined Sales Tax
Governing Board is following this strategy by not advocating for federal e-fairness
legislation and letting the states implement Wayfair individually. At the same time,
the Governing Board is monitoring Congress’s activities related to remote sales tax
collection, pushing back on any activities that might jeopardize implementation of
Wayfair.120
The Agreement preserves the states’ taxing authority, allowing them to
decide on the taxation or exemption of any item or service. However, member states
must adhere to the definitions of the Agreement and other provisions of unification
and simplification.121 The Agreement includes a detailed library of definitions that
contributed substantially to the unification and simplification among member states’
taxing systems. This library, together with administration practices, must be included
in the tax framework of each member state. 122 In addition, the SSUTA unified state
and local tax bases by requiring that states provide state-level administration, instead
of several sub-state administrations.123 The Agreement simplifies the tax rates by
requiring that the same tax rates be applied across a state’s tax jurisdictions.
The SSUTA unified sourcing rules, but the rules themselves are still
complex. The source of a retail sale of a product from a physical location is the
location of the business itself, while the source of remote sales is the location where

116. See generally STREAMLINED SALES AND USE TAX AGREEMENT, STREAMLINED SALES TAX
GOVERNING BD., INC. (2018), https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/docs/default-source/agreement
/ssuta/ssuta-as-amended-2018-12-14.pdf?sfvrsn=8a83c020_6 [https://perma.cc/8VFL-ESEU].
117. But see Brian Galle, Designing Interstate Institutions: The Example of the Streamlined Sales and
Use Tax Agreement, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1381, 1388 (2007) (analyzing and criticizing the SSUTA
institutional design for its flaws and suggesting conditioning the federal deductibility of corporate state
and local taxes on a finding by a federal agency, which issues certificates that the state collecting the taxes
in fact is substantially compliant with the SSUTA).
118. See Kathleen Hale & Ramona McNeal, Technology, Politics, and E-Commerce: Internet Sales
Tax and Interstate Cooperation, 28 GOV’T INFO. Q. 262 (2011).
119. See John A. Swain & Walter Hellerstein, The Political Economy of the Streamlined Sales and
Use Tax Agreement, 58 NAT’L TAX J. 605 (2005).
120. Schedule of Meetings, STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., INC. 12 (Dec. 14, 2018),
https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/docs/default-source/governing-board-meetings/gb-meetingbook/gb-meeting-publication-2018-05-providence.pdf?sfvrsn=6496fb0d_6
[https://perma.cc/R8NDE9AW].
121. STREAMLINED SALES AND USE AGREEMENT, supra note 116, § 103.
122. Id. §§ 327–328.
123. Id. §§ 301–302.
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the purchaser receives the product. When neither applies, the source of the sale is the
address of the purchaser. The address is determined based on the business’s records
or as reported during the sale. When none of the above applies, “then the location
will be determined by the address from which tangible personal property was
shipped, from which the digital good or the computer software delivered
electronically was first available for transmission by the seller, or from which the
service was provided.”124 However, in lieu of these provisions, a state “may elect to
source the retail sale of tangible personal property and digital goods” to the location
where the seller receives the order, as long as some conditions are met.125
The complexity of sourcing rules is further compounded by special rules
that apply to sales of “advertising and promotional direct mail,” and
“telecommunication and related services.”126 It is also important to add that the
Agreement provides explicit restrictions on state changes:
A member state shall not include any product transferred
electronically in its definition of “tangible personal property.”
“Ancillary
services,”
“computer
software,”
and
“telecommunication services” shall be excluded from the term
“products transferred electronically.” For purposes of this section,
the term “transferred electronically” means obtained by the
purchaser by means other than tangible storage media.127
The SSUTA further requires each member state to make uniform its tax
return and remittance procedures so that sellers submit only a single tax return or
remittance to all tax jurisdictions within the state. The SSUTA regulates registration
and enhances the use of technology to comply with the law through Certified
Automated Systems (CAS) and Certified Service Providers (CSP).128 The SSUTA
distinguishes between four models of sellers,129 and requires member states to make
available online registration and submission of a Simplified Electronic Return (SER)
and electronic remittance.130

124. Id. § 310(A)(5).
125. Id. § 310.1.
126. Id. §§ 313–314.
127. Id. § 333.
128. The CAS is an approved software that determines the applicable state and local sales and use tax
for a transaction based on databases of boundaries and rates; generates reports and returns and calculates
tax amounts and remittance amounts; and maintains records of the transactions. Id. § 202. The CSP is a
certified agent to perform the seller’s sales and use tax functions. Id. § 203.
129. The four models are as follows: Model 1 Seller is a seller registered under the agreement that has
selected a Certified Service Provider to perform his functions in collecting the tax; Model 2 Seller is a
seller registered “under the [a]greement that has selected a CAS to perform part of its . . . functions”;
Model 3 Seller is a registered seller
that has sales in at least five member states, has total annual sales revenue of at least five hundred million
dollars, has a proprietary system that calculates the amount of tax due each jurisdiction, and has entered
into a performance agreement with the member states that establishes a tax performance standard for the
seller;
Model 4 seller is registered under the agreement but does not fall under any other model of sellers. Id. §§
205–207.1.
130. Id. §§ 318(C)–(D), 319.
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The SSUTA enhanced compliance with sales taxation, but states could, and
should, develop the Agreement further to meet new tax challenges in an era of digital
commerce post Wayfair. The SSUTA proved that multistate coordination and
cooperation is the right way. This platform is the starting point in the long journey
toward improving the system of collecting sales taxes from remote online businesses
and transactions.
2.

The Failure of Federal Legislation

The Quill Court called upon Congress to address the issue of collecting
sales and use taxes from remote sellers, however, Congress failed in passing any
legislation. The first bill introduced in Congress was the Streamlined Sales and Use
Tax Act of 2003, which expressed the sense of Congress that the SSUTA provided
enough simplification and uniformity to warrant federal authorization to states that
are parties to the Agreement to impose collection duties on remote sellers. The tax
empowerment according to this bill required the inclusion of small business
exceptions and implementations of reasonable seller compensation. However, the
bill never received consideration.131 Similarly, the Marketplace Fairness Act
(MFA)132 and the Remote Transactions Parity Act (RTPA) 133 both failed. These
proposals authorized states to impose collection duties on remote sellers not
qualifying for a small remote seller exception, if the state is a member of the SSUTA
or if the state adopted and implemented the minimum simplification requirements of
the Acts.
The principles and guidelines of Wayfair acknowledged the necessity and
appropriateness of simplification and burdens minimization, but Wayfair achieved
these values in a flexible and cooperative manner rather than federal imposition. Both
the MFA and RTPA failed to address issues of interstate cooperation and interstate
conflicts. These issues are very important to address, but Congress is still in the mode
of limiting the powers of the states, which is unjustified in this field. Simplification
and burdens minimization are important but there are several better ways to achieve
those goals. The purpose of the U.S. Constitution is not to limit the tax powers of the
states but to limit undue burdens on interstate commerce.
Two other failed congressional attempts at legislation support the argument
against federal imposition, which tries to limit the tax powers of the states instead of
focusing on the most appropriate way to limit undue burdens on interstate commerce.
The first one, the No Regulation Without Representation Act, prohibited a state from
taxing remote sellers without a physical presence in the State.134 The constitutionality

131. S. 1736, 108th Cong. (2003).
132. First introduced in the 112th Congress, S. 1832, 112th Cong. (2011), and in the next three
Congresses. Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013, S. 743, 113th Cong. (2013) (passed by Senate);
Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. (2015); Marketplace Fairness Act of 2017, S. 976,
115th Cong. (2017). On March 13, 2018, a Senate resolution was introduced “expressing the sense of the
Senate that the Marketplace Fairness Act of 2017 would harm the economy of the United States and place
an undue burden on small businesses and multiple States across the United States.” S. Res. 433, 115th
Cong. (2018).
133. Introduced in the 114th and 115th Congress. Remote Transactions Parity Act of 2015, H.R. 2775,
114th Cong. (2015); Remote Transactions Parity Act of 2017, H.R. 2193, 115th Cong. (2017).
134. H.R. 5893, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R. 2887, 115th Cong. (2017).
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of such federal legislation is questionable, but the main point is that Congress focuses
on limiting state powers rather than supporting the states and minimizing burdens on
interstate commerce. Legislation like the No Regulation Without Representation Act
only serve to undermine the rights of states and their interests.135 The second failed
attempt was the Online Sales Simplification Act (OSSA), which altered the tax
jurisdiction to the location of the retailer. This alteration contradicts the wellestablished and justified destination principle and unfairly privileges states with
stronger retailers over states with more consumers.136
These proposals presented a clear anti-state mindset in Congress, which
justifies the point against federal legislation and supports a framework of multistate
coordination and cooperation. It is not surprising that the National Conference of
State Legislatures wrote, on September 18, 2018, a letter opposing federal legislation
to the leaders of the Senate and House of Representatives.137
One probable explanation for Congress’s failure is that the competing group
interests at Congress paralyzed it on this issue.138 If true, this competition of interests
at Congress presents risks to the states if lobbying powers succeed in their selfinterest-based efforts. The risk is serious because the states are disadvantaged in the
legislative process.139 Furthermore, the damage from federal imposition that limits
Wayfair implementation is tremendous. It risks the states’ fiscal base, budget

135. The sharp response of the NCSL expresses the concerns clearly. See NCSL Opposes
Congressional Legislation to Stop Implementation of the Wayfair Decision, NCSL (Sept. 14, 2018),
https://www.mwe.com/~/media/files/thought-leadership/blogs/online-sales-simplification-act-of2016.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/QE5G-DX5P].
136. See MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N, ANALYSIS OF ONLINE SIMPLIFICATION SALES SIMPLIFICATION
ACT OF 2016, at 2, 9–10 (2016), http://www.mtc.gov/getattachment/2016-10-04-MTC-OSSAAnalysis.pdf.aspx [https://perma.cc/53XB-ZQXP].
137. See Letter from Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures to Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, Minority
Leader Chuck Schumer, Speaker Paul D. Ryan, and Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (Sept. 18, 2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/statefed/Wayfair_Decision091818.pdf
[https://perma.cc/97VM-K8BM]. The NCSL wrote in this letter:
Now, less than three months after the ruling, proposals have emerged in Congress that
would hinder state implementation efforts, preempt state authority, and create more
problems than solutions. A false narrative is being painted by opponents of the Wayfair
ruling who have used fear mongering tactics to circulate rumors of chaos and
uncertainty at the state level. This narrative could not be further from the truth. The
states have heeded SCOTUS’ guidance and have ensured that their newfound authority
is implemented correctly and fairly.
Some members of Congress who stalled action on this issue in the past, are now hastily
pushing legislation that would limit or pre-empt state authority to collect remote sales
taxes, thereby forestalling states efforts to use the revenues to reduce other states taxes
or to reinvest in crucial state services like education or infrastructure. States have
proven that they are working diligently and thoughtfully to create a fair and simplified
collection system that will minimize compliance burdens and create sales tax parity for
all sellers.
As the states continue to ensure that remote sales tax implementation is done properly,
we strongly urge you to respect these states’ efforts and not let legislation advance that
would seek to hinder or halt implementation of the Wayfair decision by imposing
federal requirements on remote sales tax collection.
Id.
138. Galle, supra note 46, at 159.
139. Zelinsky, supra note 46 at 1178.
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stability, and their ability to provide their residents with appropriate services and
protection of rights.
In sum, Congress’s failed efforts revealed the states’ disadvantage in the
legislative process, along with the risks of legislation that only limits the states’
powers rather than minimizing undue burdens and ensuring free interstate commerce
as required by the U.S. Constitution. In Wayfair, the Supreme Court ensured, and
will likely continue to guarantee, the fulfillment of constitutional requirements.
States should lead on these matters independently according to the guidelines of the
Supreme Court, and they should further develop their multistate framework and
tools.140 In my view, Congress should, and could, limit itself to assisting in
alleviating the collection of sales taxes from foreign online sellers.
III.

IMPROVING THE SSUTA: MULTISTATE CLEARINGHOUSE &
TECHNOLOGIES OF COMPLIANCE

States should add additional measures to the current system of tax collection
to collect sales tax appropriately in the era of digitalization and e-commerce. First,
in further developing the SSUTA multi-state framework, I suggest learning from the
experiences of the European Union (E.U.). The E.U. has a long and rich experience
in collecting another type of consumption tax, the value added tax (VAT), from
remote online sales in a multi-country setting. States can learn and implement the
E.U.’s one-stop shop scheme, which enables VAT compliance in one jurisdiction for
all E.U. member states. I suggest developing the scheme further by creating one
clearinghouse for the multiple jurisdictions of sales taxation in the United States.
Second, states should enhance developing technologies of compliance. Technology
could, and should, play an important role in the new world of online taxation. New
technologies are likely to reduce costs of compliance and enhance automation of tax
collection. Further, the industry has markets and incentives to develop such
technologies. States should facilitate this development by granting access to data
systems and encouraging cooperation through other means.
A.

Insights from the European VAT
1.

Multistate Framework of Harmonization, Coordination, and
Cooperation

The E.U.’s VAT system is one of the leading models of VAT in the
world.141 The E.U. VAT directive aims to harmonize a common system of VAT
among E.U. member states that “does not distort the conditions of competition or
hinder the free movement of goods and services.”142 The directive establishes one
140. See Stop Taxing Our Potential Act of 2019, S. 128, 116th Cong. § 1 (2019); Protecting Businesses
from Burdensome Compliance Cost Act of 2019, H.R. 379, 116th Cong. § 1 (2019); Online Sales
Simplicity and Small Business Relief Act of 2019, H.R.1933, 116th Cong. § 1 (2019); Digital Goods and
Services Tax Fairness Act of 2019, S. 765, 116th Cong. §1(2019).
141. See ALAN SCHENK ET AL., VALUE ADDED TAX: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 47–48 (2d ed. 2015)
(“The EU’s credit-invoice VAT is the most prevalent form of VAT in use today.”).
142. See Council Directive 2006/112 of 28 November 2006 on the Common System of Value Added
Tax, 2006 O.J. (L 347) 1, 1 (EC).
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common system of VAT, sets the main framework and principles of VAT,
harmonizes the base, and allocates the VAT jurisdiction through detailed “place of
supply” rules based on the destination principle.143 The E.U.’s VAT base includes
the “supply of goods,” which is defined as the transfer of tangible property, and the
“supply of services,” which is defined residually as “any transaction that does not
constitute a supply of goods.”144 A supply of services includes, among others, the
assignment of intangible property, the provision of “electronically supplied
services,” and the supply of “telecommunications services.”145
Beyond the harmonization of the base, each member state sets its rates and
exemptions in its national VAT law while ensuring neutrality between intracommunity trade, and trade within the member state, by the application of similar
rates to both.146 According to Article 96 of the directive: “Member States shall apply
a standard rate of VAT, which shall be fixed by each Member State as a percentage
of the taxable amount and which shall be the same for the supply of goods and for
the supply of services.”147
The VAT directive relies on registration of businesses as the main
instrument of collection. Once registered, the business receives a VAT identification
number according to a standardized system that identifies the business’s member
state.148 The business is obliged to issue invoices and collect the VAT on its
transactions. The directive enhances electronic invoices and requires member states
to accept e-invoices as long as the system guarantees authentication.149 Further , the
directive provides a special scheme that enables suppliers outside of the E.U. to
register with one Member State of Identification (MSI), which in turn allocates an
individual VAT identification number to the supplier.150 The supplier would then
submit to the MSI, by electronic means, a VAT return for each calendar quarter151
regarding all its transactions with customers in all member states, and pay the VAT
to a bank account designated by the MSI.152
The level and intensity of harmonization in the E.U. VAT directive is
significantly higher than the SSUTA. Obviously, the political and fiscal unions in
the E.U. and the United States are very different. The E.U. VAT directive is a
supranational law of the E.U. that binds each member state. The SSUTA, on the other
hand, is a multilateral agreement between the states to coordinate and cooperate at
the levels agreed upon. The directive sets a common system of VAT with a common
base of taxation, while the SSUTA does not set any common systems. Instead, the
SSUTA respects existing separate systems of each state and sets agreed norms to
reduce conflicts between those systems, such as the library of definitions. Under the
SSUTA, each state would retain the choice of whether an item is taxable and at what
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

See id. tit. V.
Id. arts. 14, 24.
Id. arts. 25, 56(i), (k).
See id. art. 94.
Id. art. 96.
Id. arts. 214–215.
Id. art. 233.
Id. art. 362.
Id. art. 364.
Id. arts. 365, 367.
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rate. The directive, in contrast, sets VAT exemptions, rules regarding the place of
taxation, and other rules that draw boundaries and allocate the tax pie. Under the
SSUTA, each state sets its own exemptions, and rules governing the place of taxation
are coordinated to reduce conflicts as much as possible. There are fundamental
differences between the E.U. directive and the SSUTA, but there are similarities in
the general direction of harmonization to reduce cross-jurisdictional conflicts.
Given the E.U’s lengthy history of regulating cross-jurisdictional taxes,
states can gain insights from the E.U. VAT directive: In the era of online sales, states
should intensify the harmonization processes of their sales tax. With the increase of
cross-jurisdictional online transactions, it is essential and wise to reduce costs of
compliance through harmonization. The SSUTA contributed substantially in this
regard, and states should build upon it in enhancing a multi-state framework of
harmonization, coordination, and cooperation. So far, 23 states are full members of
the SSUTA.153 More states should simplify and harmonize their sales tax systems to
comply with the requirements of the SSUTA. The member states should then update
the SSUTA itself to intensify harmonization to increase coordination and
cooperation.
I suggest, for example, the following amendments: First, member states
should agree to a common core base and common exemptions to reduce the
differences in bases between states. The SSUTA harmonized the base within the
state; however, each state is free to set its own base and exemptions. The base usually
distinguishes between several categories of products and has numerous exemptions.
As a result, base gaps exist between the states and even within the state. As to the
rates, it is true that there is only one rate for each tax jurisdiction, but because there
are so many sub-jurisdictions within each state, the number of rates and jurisdictions
is extremely high. The states and their local jurisdictions should work together to
reduce the variety of rates within their state to a minimum.
For example, general clothing is taxable in Georgia while it is exempted in
New Jersey. Newspapers are taxable in Georgia but exempted in New Jersey.154
Kentucky taxes clothing, newspapers and even medicines while Vermont exempts
all these products.155 These and many other differences in the base between the
SSUTA’s member states complicate the system, so states should reduce the gaps to
a minimum in the process of harmonizing their base. Similarly, the tax rates within
a state differ. For instance, there are 159 sub-tax jurisdictions and rates within
Georgia itself.156 This complexity of rates increases compliance burdens, so each of
the SSUTA’s member states should work to reduce its sub-tax jurisdictions and the
complexity of their rates.

153. State
Detail,
STREAMLINED
SALES
TAX
GOVERNING
BD.,
https://www.
streamlinedsalestax.org/Shared-Pages/State-Detail [https://perma.cc/XG6Z-S7C5].
154. New Jersey: Sales Tax Handbook, https://www.salestaxhandbook.com/new-jersey/sales-taxtaxability#taxability [https://perma.cc/9PCB-KHLR].
155. Vermont: Sales Tax Handbook, https://www.salestaxhandbook.com/vermont/sales-taxtaxability#taxability [https://perma.cc/W5UJ-LXUF].
156. Dep’t of Revenue, Georgia Sales and Use Tax Rate Chart, SALES TAX RATES – GEN.,
https://dor.georgia.gov/document/document/january-2020-rate-chart/download [https://perma.cc/PY6M25F5].
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Second, member states should agree on, and introduce new, definitions that
relate to digital products and transactions. These definitions would clarify the scope
and boundaries of the tax base in the era of digital economy. The basic principle
should continue to be that the substance of the product matters, rather than its form
or method of delivery.
For example, books could be purchased in a bookstore in hardcopy format,
downloaded online in electronic format, or used online in the cloud. Similarly,
software could be purchased in the store on physical storage devices, downloaded
online, or used in the cloud. According to the principle of substance rather than form,
the same tax rule should apply to books, e-books, and cloud-books despite the
difference in format. Similarly, the same tax should apply to software whether it is
stored on physical devices, downloaded, or used in the cloud. However, currently
these issues are not fully settled or harmonized in an efficient manner. Some states
share a standard definition, some states use their own definition, and some states do
not use any definition at all. The current state of sales taxation on digital products is
very complex between member states, and generally.157 North Carolina, for instance,
exempts “Custom Software” but taxes “Canned Software” and certain digital
products.158 In North Carolina, if any of the following items are delivered or accessed
electronically, and not considered tangible personal property, it is subject to taxation:
“An audio work; An audiovisual work; A book, a magazine, a newspaper, a
newsletter, a report, or another publication; A photograph or a greeting card.”159
Similar taxability exists in Washington but the definitions of digital products differs.
Washington provides a six-part structural approach for defining digital products and
their tax liability.160 There is no doubt that the rules and structures are complex and
should be harmonized and simplified.
The SSUTA started to handle the issue. According to the Agreement,
member states shall not include “specified digital products” within the definition of
tangible personal property. In its detailed definitions of “specified digital products,”
the Agreement includes digital audio-visual works, digital audio works, and digital
books. The Agreement provides that digital products “delivered electronically,”
include, but are not limited to, software, music, video, reading materials, or ring
tones. It adds that a member state may exempt “prewritten computer software” that
is “delivered electronically” or by “load and leave.” As a result, member states have
157. See JOYCE BEEBE, THE CURRENT STATE OF SALES TAX ON DIGITAL PRODUCTS 3 (2019),
https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/ff22e639/bi-report-080719-cpf-salestaxdigital.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A5WZ-W8FJ].
158. North Carolina: Sales Tax Handbook, https://www.salestaxhandbook.com/north-carolina/salestax-taxability#taxability [https://perma.cc/HW43-EW8W].
159. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, Certain Digital Property, SALES & USE TAX (Jan. 8, 2020),
https://www.ncdor.gov/taxes-forms/sales-and-use-tax/certain-digital-property [https://perma.cc/ZH5J9EJM].
160. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 458-20-15503 (2013) (“Part 1: Are the products or services transferred
electronically? If yes, go to Part 2. Part 2: Does the product or service meet the general definitions of
digital product or digital code? If yes, go to Part 3. Part 3: Are there applicable exclusions from the general
definitions of the digital product or digital code? If no, go to Part 4. Part 4: Are the sales of the digital
product or digital code sourced to Washington? If yes, go to Part 5. Part 5: Are there applicable retail sales
or use tax exemptions for the purchase or use of the digital product or digital code? If no, the transaction
is likely taxable in Washington. Part 6: Miscellaneous provisions.”).
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legislated specific provisions for digital products, electronically delivered digital
products, and software. Consequently, states vary in their definitions and scope of
taxation. To reduce complexity, the SSUTA should include a harmonized definition
of digital products and electronically delivered digital products as a tax base. States
could then decide whether to impose the tax on this digital base or not, but they could
not complicate the digital base through a variety of definitions and/or exemptions.
2.

Destination Jurisdiction, Mini One-Stop Shop, and Clearinghouse

As of January 1st, 2015, the E.U. VAT directive provides that electronically
supplied services and all telecommunications, radio, and television broadcasting
supplied to a non-taxable person (B2C) are to be taxed in the member state in which
the customer is established, has his permanent address, or usually resides, regardless
of where the taxable person supplying those services is established.161 This
destination principle is well-established worldwide as the leading jurisdictional
principle in consumption tax.162 The adoption and implementation of the principle
on electronically supplied services and telecommunication services contributed
substantially to the collection of the E.U.’s VAT on remote online transactions.163
States should follow the E.U.’s model when imposing sales taxes on online
transactions by providing clear rules for tax jurisdiction based on the destination
principle, which taxes these transactions at the final destination of consumption. This
is a very important substantive point that states should consider when updating the
SSUTA and legislating sales tax collection from online sales post Wayfair. States
should strengthen the destination rule according to section 310 of the SSUTA and
limit, or eliminate if possible, the origin sourcing rule in section 310.1. An
amendment to the SSUTA could elaborate and develop rules to determine the tax
jurisdiction for online sales in an accurate and efficient manner. The current sourcing
rules are costly because they are complex and rely on several principles. The SSUTA
could instead introduce rules that are more efficient by looking toward the E.U.’s
experience in adopting the destination principle as its only sourcing rule. In applying
the destination principle, the zip code of the credit card used in the transaction is an
accurate and efficient proxy of the tax jurisdiction in most cases, and, therefore,
should be used as the first criteria. As a second criterion, I suggest relying on the
delivery address, which is also a good proxy of destination.

161. Council Directive 2006/112 of 28 November 2006 on the Common System of Value Added Tax,
supra note 142, at art. 56.
162. See ALAN SCHENK, VICTOR THURONYI & WEI CUI, VALUE ADDED TAX: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH 196 (2d. 2015); EUR. UNIVS. COOPERATING ON TAXES, VALUE ADDED TAX AND THE DIGITAL
ECONOMY: THE 2015 EU RULES AND BROADER ISSUES 73 (Marie Lamensch, Edoardo Traversa, Servaas
van Thiel eds., 2015). According to the destination principle, VAT is imposed at the country of the
consumers where consumption is assumed to occur.
163. See SCHENK ET AL., supra note 162; ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV., International VAT/GST
Guidelines
40
(2017),
https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/international-vat-gst-guidelines
_9789264271401-en#page1 [https://perma.cc/WGQ4-JN2G]; Walter Hellerstein, Consumption Taxation
of Cross-Border Trade in Services in an Age of Globalization, in GLOBALIZATION AND ITS TAX
DISCONTENTS: TAX POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS 305 (Arthur J. Cockfield ed., 2010);
Marie Lamensch, Tax Assessment in a Digital Context: A Critical Analysis of the 2015 EU Rules, in
VALUE ADDED TAX AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, supra note 162, at 39.
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The E.U. Mini One-Stop Shop (MOSS) regime is an optional simplification
measure to enhance compliance with the VAT. It allows taxable persons supplying
B2C services to non-taxable persons in member states in which the supplier does not
have an establishment to account for the VAT due on those supplies via a web portal
in the member state in which the supplier is identified.164 The VAT return is sent to
the MSI and details the transactions in all member states of consumption, along with
the VAT due to each. The member state of identification then remits the VAT to all
member states of consumption according to the E.U.’s place-of-supply rules and
rates.165
According to the European Commission’s assessment report, the MOSS
scheme contributed substantially to enhancing compliance with the E.U.’s VAT:
The general feedback from business is that the MOSS was a
necessary tool to mitigate the increased administrative burden on
businesses following the new place of supply rules introduced in
2015. This is confirmed by the measurements of the administrative
burden. The average business active in B2C cross-border TBEservices [telecom, broadcasting and electronically supplied
services] . . . incurs a substantially lower administrative burden.166
The SSUTA moved some steps in this direction when it provided a
Streamlined Sales Tax Registration System (SSTRS).167 However, the SSTRS only
164. See generally DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR TAX’N & CUSTOMS UNION (EUR. COMM’N), GUIDE
THE VAT MINI ONE STOP SHOP (2013), https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business
/vat/telecommunications-broadcasting-electronic-services/sites/mossportal/files/mini-one-stop-shopguidelines_en_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9PC-4N23].
165. See Council Implementing Regulation 1042/2013 of 7 October 2013 Amending Implementing
Regulation (EU) No 282/2011 as Regards the Place of Supply of Services, 2013 O.J. (L 284) 1;
Commission Implementing Regulation 815/2012 of 13 September 2012, Laying Down Detailed Rules for
the Application of Council Regulation 904/2010, 2012 O.J. (L 249) 3, art. 5; Council Regulation 904/2010
of 7 October 2010 on Administrative Cooperation and Combating Fraud in the Field of Value Added Tax,
2010 O.J. (L 268) 1, art. 41. However, in cases where suppliers have a business establishment in a Member
State, the MOSS scheme is unavailable for supplies made in that Member State. These suppliers must
account for VAT in that Member State using the local VAT registration system. See Council Regulation
(EU) No 967/2012 of 9 October 2012 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 282/2011 as Regards
the Special Schemes for Non-Established Taxable Persons Supplying Telecommunications Services,
Broadcasting Services or Electronic Services to Non-Taxable Persons, 2012 O.J. (L 290) 1.
166. European Comm’n, VAT Aspects of Cross-Border E-Commerce—Options for Modernisation;
Final Report—Lot 3: Assessment of the Implementation of the 2015 Place of Supply Rules and the MiniOne Stop Shop 103 (2016), https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/vat_aspects_crossborder_e-commerce_final_report_lot3.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BJD-9RQX ][hereinafter VAT Aspects of
Cross Border E-Commerce]; Dóra Krinis, VAT Challenges of the Digital Economy-An EU Perspective
5 (Apr. 2016) (unpublished dissertation, Univ. do Minho), https://repositorium.sdum.
uminho.pt/bitstream/1822/42303/1/D%C3%B3ra%20Krinis.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N6V6-538E].
However, the EU has identified the following as issues to be addressed in the future: “(1) the lack of a
threshold for micro-enterprises, (2) the lack of awareness of the changes in some [Member States], (3)
difficulties in identifying customers for some businesses (4) record keeping/B2C invoicing requirements,
and (5) home country audits.” Id. at 66; see also Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment
Accompanying the Document Proposals for a Council Directive, a Council Implementing Regulation and
a Council Regulation on Modernising VAT for Cross-border B2C E-Commerce, COM (2016).
167. Streamlined
Member
States,
Streamlined
Sales
Tax
Registration
System
https://www.sstregister.org/ [https://perma.cc/64HG-WNS8].
TO
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allowed registering in all member states by completing a single application online. It
is just a single application, but the SSTRS requires multiple registrations. There are
also multiple filings, albeit with the possibility to use a Certified Service Provider
(CSP) and a Certified Automated System (CAS).168 But, with the fast rise of online
sales, a single registration is essential and would contribute to reducing costs of
compliance, as the E.U. learned from using the MOSS. Accordingly, the states
should consider moving the SSTRS toward a one-stop shop system for compliance
with all states’ sales tax collection duties. Furthermore, in my opinion, in the U.S.
context of multistate sales taxation on online transactions, the development of a
multistate clearinghouse would contribute substantially to tax collection and cost
reduction. In the United States, interstate commerce is very intensive, so a
clearinghouse would be essential to reduce compliance and administration costs.
To that end, states should develop their registration systems similar to the
MOSS, so that registration in one state is enough to account for sales tax in all states,
instead of registering in multiple states through one centralized system of
registration. The state of registration could collect the taxes of all states based on the
destination principle and then remit those taxes to the destination states. I add that
states should develop their remittance systems as well. The intensive commerce
between the states likewise justifies the establishment of a clearinghouse to run the
system of remittance between the states. In a clearinghouse, states’ accounts would
offset each other so that states would remit only final balances at the end of each
month, or maybe quarter, to reduce the costs of the system.
B.

The Role of Technology

Technology is playing an important role in enhancing tax compliance and
reducing costs of compliance in the era of digitalization. Following Wayfair, the role
of technology probably will, and should, rise.
Technology is already used intensively and efficiently in the Streamlined
Sales Tax Registration System (SSTRS) to enable one online application for all
selected States. Similarly, the Simplified Electronic Return (SER) uses technology
to simplify returns and reduce costs through electronic filings. According to the
SSUTA, each state must adopt web services as the standard transmission process.
An advanced technology is already used in the Certified Automated System (CAS),
which automates the calculation and collection of sales tax. This system uses
boundary and tax rate databases, according to standardized formats, in order to
calculate sales tax liability according to the destination principle and rules. So far,

168. A Certified Service Provider (CSP) is an agent certified under the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax
Agreement to perform all the seller’s sales and use tax functions, other than the seller’s obligation to remit
tax on its own purchases. A Certified Automated System (CAS) is software certified under the
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement that is designed for a seller who wants to use certified tax
calculation software but keep the responsibility for filing returns and remitting the tax in-house. The
software system of a CAS interfaces with the seller’s accounting system to: (1) identify which products
and services are taxable, (2) apply the appropriate tax rate, (3) maintain a record of the transaction, and
(4) determine the amount of tax to report and pay to the Streamlined member states. A seller who uses a
CAS is responsible for filing the tax returns, paying the taxes dues to each of the Streamlined states, and
resolving any notices or audits by any of the Streamlined member states.
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the Streamlined Sales Tax Governing Board has approved five Certified Service
Providers (CSP) to provide the CAS.169
In discussing technology and the Streamlined Sales Tax Project (SSTP),
William Fox and others wrote the following:
Technology will play a vital role in making the SSTP a
success. . . . [A] factor that makes the long term SSTP success a
possibility is the ability to reduce those agreements into a
technological solution that is accessible to both large and small
retailers and allows them the ability to cost-effectively apply
agreed-upon rules to hundreds of thousands of unique
products. . . . Presumably technology makes it easier for firms to
exploit states’ economies remotely but also easier to administer
and comply with the tax.170
Today, it is clear that the use of technology in the SSTP reduced costs and
enhanced compliance. However, I argue that the current situation does not achieve
its full potential in using technologies and their benefits. The SSTP utilizes
technology, but the E.U. VAT directive uses technology to a far greater extent and
169. These providers are: Accurate Tax, Avalara, Intuit, Sovos, and Tax Cloud. Certified Service
SALES
TAX
GOVERNING
BOARD,
INC.,
Provider’s
List,
STREAMLINED
https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/certified-service-providers/certified-service-providers-list
[https://perma.cc/526Q-HRQD]. The Streamlined Sales Tax Governing Board describes each CSP as
SALES
TAX
GOVERNING
BOARD,
INC.,
follows:
Accurate
Tax,
STREAMLINED
https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/csp-details/accurate-tax
[https://perma.cc/R5J7-EF65]
(“The
AccurateTax.com TaxTools suite brings SSTP-certified rules and transactions to the online point of sale
for retailers of all market sizes and makes it easy for you, as a retailer to ensure you are calculating,
collecting, reporting and remitting the most accurate tax information possible.”); Avalara, STREAMLINED
SALES TAX GOVERNING BOARD, INC., https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/csp-details/avalara
[https://perma.cc/ARR8-4GPT] (“Avalara’s compliance services are designed to work seamlessly inside
your ecommerce, ERP, accounting, POS, or other financial system, delivering sales and use tax calculation
in real time, cross-checking thousands of rates, rules, and jurisdictional boundaries, for more accurate
results than manual tax compliance. Avalara’s solutions also handle other core tasks of the tax compliance
process, from state by state registration to preparing and filing returns, remitting taxes, and maintaining
tax records.”); Exactor (a subsidiary of Intuit), STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BOARD, INC.,
https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/csp-details/exactor [https://perma.cc/G7N5-2DMC ] (“Intuit’s
service gives business owners the ability to automate their sales tax efforts with an ease of use unparalleled
in the industry. Intuit provides an end-to-end solution inside of QuickBooks Online that seamlessly and
automatically bridges all elements of a transaction, starting from the point of transaction, such as the
shopping cart, through the final e-filing and remittance of taxes owing.”); Sovos, STREAMLINED SALES
TAX
GOVERNING
BOARD,
INC.,
https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/csp-details/sovos
[https://perma.cc/5YRP-4D7R] (“The Sovos Intelligent Compliance Cloud combines world-class
regulatory analysis with its secure, scalable and reliable S1 cloud software platform to create a global
solution for tax determination, e-invoicing compliance and tax reporting.”); and TaxCloud, STREAMLINED
SALES TAX GOVERNING BOARD, INC., https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/csp-details/taxcloud
[https://perma.cc/DV9E-EY5K] (“TaxCloud is a free, easy-to-use sales tax management service. It
handles every aspect of sales tax, from calculation to collection to filing - and it’s completely free.
TaxCloud can be easily integrated into most accounting, order management, and shopping cart systems.”).
Taxcloud is a state paid option into 24 member states of the SSUTA. TaxCloud, STREAMLINED SALES
TAX
GOVERNING
BOARD,
INC.,
https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/csp-details/taxcloud
[https://perma.cc/5YQS-K2RN].
170. William F. Fox, LeAnn Luna & Matthew N. Murray, The SSTP and Technology, 61 NAT’L TAX
J. 823, 835-37 (2008).

152

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 51; No. 1

has a longer history of doing so. Hence, the SSTP could, and should, learn from this
and other experiences.
I suggest, as detailed in Part III.A.2, that states establish a one-stop shop for
registration and compliance in the state of registration through which compliance
will occur for all states, and to establish a clearinghouse for offsetting the balances
and accounts between the states. In this system, I suggest registering, filing, and
clearing through advanced web-based technologies and blockchain-based
technologies. This process of automation will likely progress, and should progress,
in the post-Wayfair era, which in turn would also advance interstate cooperation.171
In developing post-Wayfair sales tax technologies, states and private
entrepreneurs could, and should, learn from the long experience of the E.U. and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).172 The private
sector in the E.U., with cooperation from the member states, developed, and
continues to develop, technologies of tax compliance to meet the challenges of
digitalization and e-commerce.173 The MOSS system relies on and uses technology
substantially. Electronic VAT payments, filing, and recently invoicing, are becoming
standard.174 E.U. countries and the European Commission decided to introduce a
European standard for electronic invoicing in response to the many e-invoice formats
used across the E.U. While all contracting authorities will have to accept electronic
invoices that comply with the European norm, country-specific rules will remain
valid. E.U. countries must transpose the E-invoicing Directive 2014/55/EU into their
national laws and comply with the European standard on electronic invoicing. Public
authorities across the E.U. should now be able to process e-invoices respecting the
European standard.175
E.U. member states are progressing in implementing electronic invoicing
and filing. For example, Spain’s electronic invoicing system, the Immediate
Submission of Information, enables taxpayers to electronically transmit billing
records from VAT Books by using web services based on exchanging Extensible
Markup Language (XML) messages or, if applicable, by filling out a web form.176 In
171. See Kathleen Hale & Ramona McNeal, Technology, Politics, and e-commerce: Internet Sales
Tax and Interstate Cooperation, 28 GOV’T INFO. Q. 262 (2011).
172. See European Comm’n, Tax and Customs Union, VAT Reports Published,
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/vat/vat-reports-published_en
[https://perma.cc/GS4GTUNS]; ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. DEV., TECHNOLOGY TOOLS TO TACKLE TAX EVASION AND TAX FRAUD,
at 6–7 (2017).
173. See Nicholas Hallam, The Rise of VAT Technology, BLOOMBERG TAX (Mar. 21, 2019),
https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report-international/insight-the-rise-of-vat-technology
[https://perma.cc/5CYB-TTJG].
174. See PWC, VAT Compliance: The Impact on Business and How Technology Can Help (2017),
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/pdf/pwc-vat-compliance-paying-taxes-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XHK7-DF2C] [hereinafter VAT Compliance].
175. European Comm’n, Int’l Mkt., Indus., Entrepreneurship, and SMEs, eInvoicing,
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/digital/einvoicing_en
[https://perma.cc/S92M-XB2E].
176. New VAT Management System Based on Immediate Supply of Information, AGENCIA
TRIBUTARIA,
https://www.agenciatributaria.es/AEAT.internet/en_gb/Inicio/Ayuda/Modelos__Procedimientos_y_Serv
icios/Ayuda_P_G417____IVA__Llevanza_de_libros_registro__SII_/Informacion_general/Nuevo_siste
ma_de_gestion_del_IVA_basado_en_el_Suministro_Inmediato_de_Informacion.shtml
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Portugal, certified invoice software enables companies to transfer invoice data to the
Portuguese tax authorities online on a monthly basis in a standardized format.177 As
of April 2019, the U.K. Making Tax Digital for VAT requires each VAT registered
business with over £85,000 to keep digital VAT records and submit VAT returns
digitally, which led the industry to develop software and technology for this
purpose.178 Poland replaced the current VAT return with a “standard audit file for
tax” (SAF-T) format pursuant to recommendations from the OECD.179 This would
be an expansion of the SAF-T system already used in Poland since 2016. A growing
number of tax authorities worldwide have implemented these types of systems and
have seen positive results.180
Recently, real-time technologies of tax compliance have seen greater usage.
For example, Hungary introduced real-time electronic reporting of domestic
[https://perma.cc/J959-TUBB]. In other words, this new system essentially requires taxpayers to keep
their VAT Books online, rather than internally, and through a standardized method. See id. Taxpayers that
use this system are relieved of filing certain VAT returns and are likely to experience less information
requests from the tax agency. See id.
177. Marta Andrade Póvoa, Collaboration with Tax Service Providers in the E-Invoice System, IOTA
PAPERS AT 3 (Jan. 2018), https://www.iota-tax.org/sites/default/files/documents/iota-papers_collaboration_with_the_tsp_portugal_final_updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NAU-R5VH].
REVENUE
&
CUSTOMS,
178. Overview
of
Making
Tax
Digital,
HM
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/making-tax-digital/overview-of-making-tax-digital
[https://perma.cc/28ZA-SGVW].
179. See OECD, Guidance Note: Guidance for the Standard Audit File—Tax, GUIDANCE NOTEGUIDANCE FOR DEVELOPERS OF BUSINESS AND ACCOUNTING SOFTWARE CONCERNING TAX AUDIT
REQUIREMENTS
(May
2005),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/administration/34910263.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/LCZ3-87RM].
180. See European Comm’n, Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union, Study on the
evaluation
of
invoicing
rules
of
directive
2006/112/EC
(Jan.
2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/report_evaluation_invoicing_rules_vol1_en.pf
[https://perma.cc/J9BF-YPSC]; The Mandate Is Growing for E-Invoicing Adoption, KPMG INSIGHTS
(2017), https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/us/pdf/2017/10/mandate-for-e-invoicing-adoptionkpmg.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LWK-B7GZ] (noting that “[c]urrently more than 55 countries have adopted,
or are considering, e-invoicing mandates”). See also, e.g., Karen Lynch, Brave New World, TAX INSIGHTS
FOR BUS. LEADERS, Feb. 2018, at 44, 45 (illustrating Brazil is one of the earliest adopters of an electronic
invoice system); Leandra Lederman & Joseph C. Dugan, Information Matters in Tax Enforcement 145
B.Y.U. L.R. 26–29 (2020) (describing numerous countries that have implemented these types of systems
or that have taken steps in that direction); Brazil: Corporate—Tax Administration, PWC: WORLDWIDE
TAX SUMMARIES, http://taxsummaries.pwc.com/ID/Brazil-Corporate-Tax-administration [https://
perma.cc/LM4R-RXZL] (noting that Brazil’s system, known as the Public System of Digital Accounting,
“unifies the activities of reception, validation, storage and legalization of records and documents that are
part of the commercial and tax bookkeeping of companies, through a single computerized flow of data.”);
Eva Ghirmai, Sarah Logan & Sally Murray, The Incidence and Impact of Electronic Billing Machines for
VAT in Rwanda, INT’L GROWTH CENTRE: BLOG (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.theigc.org/blog/theincidence-and-impact-of-electronic-billing-machines-for-vat-in-rwanda/ [https://perma.cc/2JK2-9KAS]
(describing Rwanda’s implementation of an Electronic Billing Machine that provides customers with
certified receipts and automatically transmits transaction data to the tax authorities on a real-time basis);
Mexican E-Invoicing: CFDI, EDICOM, https://www.edicomgroup.com/en_US/solutions/einvoicing
/LATAM_einvoicing/mexican_einvoicing.html [https://perma.cc/PT8U-7MH4] (describing Mexico’s
“Comprobantes Fiscal Digital por Internet” (CFDI) system, which requires businesses to issue electronic
invoices in a standardized format with appropriate certification and authorized digital signatures); New
VAT Management System, supra note 178 (describing Spain’s recently implemented online invoicing
system).
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Business to Business (B2B) sales invoice data as of July 1st, 2018.181 The Unified
VAT Agreement for The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (the
GCC VAT Agreement), which became effective in January, 2018, established a
multijurisdictional single-market regime, in which each member state imposes the
VAT in its domestic tax law according to the GCC VAT Agreement’s framework.182
This VAT system is similar to the E.U. VAT directive in many regards, but it also
introduced a mechanism based on blockchain technology for real-time and electronic
reporting of transaction-level tax data, and a real-time exchange of this data among
GCC tax authorities that does not yet exist in the E.U. VAT system.183 In particular,
Article 71 of the GCC VAT Agreement requires each GCC member state to create
an electronic services system that ultimately is responsible for digitally collecting
transaction-level invoice data from both buyers and sellers at the time of the
transaction. The system immediately transmits that information to a central
electronic tax information center that compiles, confirms, and exchanges the
transaction-level data collected from the separate GCC member states’ databases.184
The GCC VAT Agreement also goes further by requiring the buyer and seller’s
documentation to match digitally before it issues a confirmation number to the
parties to the transaction.185 This is an improvement over the E.U. system in that the
GCC requires real-time electronic invoicing, provides secure and accurately matched
transaction-level data, and allows member states immediate, on-demand access to
this intra-community transaction-level data.186
I recommend learning from the E.U.’s experience and the OECD’s
recommendations on tax technologies by adopting and adapting these
aforementioned technologies to collect sales taxes efficiently, especially in the postWayfair era. I think that the focus should be on real-time technologies that collect
data and sales taxes on transactions. Cloud computing and blockchain technologies
have a great potential of improving states’ existing systems. Once a business is
registered in one state of registration, that business can account for sales taxes in all
states with his state of registration through a cloud-based system which registers each
transaction, determines tax jurisdiction, and calculates the taxes due automatically.
Data recording technology can minimize sales suppression by immediately recording

181. Hungary Real-Time Invoicing Reports, AVALARA: VATLIVE, https://www.avalara.com/
vatlive/en/country-guides/europe/hungary/hungary-real-time-invoice-reporting.html
[https://perma.cc/LR3R-QGL9].
182. See Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States, The Unified VAT Agreement for The
Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, art. 2, DELOITTE (Jan. 1, 2018),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/xe/Documents/tax/me_Deloitte-english-GCC-VATTreaty-translation-May-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NGL-ZWZH] [hereinafter Unified VAT Agreement.]
Although the GCC VAT Agreement appears to contemplate the use of blockchain technology, the specific
elements depend on GCC member state laws, none of which has yet been released. See id. See also Richard
Ainsworth & Musaad Alwohaibi, The First Real-Time Blockchain VAT—GCC Solves MTIC Fraud, 86
TAX NOTES INT’L 695, 697 (May 22, 2017).
183. See Ainsworth & Alwohaibi, supra note 182, at 695; Unified VAT Agreement, supra note 182.
184. See Ainsworth & Alwohaibi, supra note 182, at 703; Unified VAT Agreement, supra note 182, at
art. 71.
185. See Ainsworth & Alwohaibi, supra note182, at 704; Unified VAT Agreement, supra note 184.
186. See Ainsworth & Alwohaibi, supra note 182, at 704, 707.
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transactions.187 Similarly, electronic invoicing and automatic data reporting to the
relevant tax authority can help reduce tax avoidance and evasion. Blockchain
technologies could, and should, be used to ensure authentication of transactions and
authentic transaction records. Calculations at the clearinghouse could then be done
on a real-time bases daily, and the states could agree on several methods of tax
transfers.
Moreover, with this huge body of transaction data, states could, and should,
develop technologies of big data and machine learning to improve their collection of
sales taxes, their structure of sales taxation, and their budget planning systems. For
example, the data, when analyzed, could teach about major products in the online
market, which could then help simplify and automate the taxation of these products.
The data could indicate trends of sales and volumes of major online retailers which
could be used to enforce the tax collection efficiently and reduce risks of
noncompliance. The data would indicate trade balances between the states which
could be used for bilateral negotiation and cooperation between the states to reduce
compliance costs and increase enforcement. Audit selection is one of the most
important tasks for every tax administration agency. In order to maximize
collections, it is critical to utilize audit selection strategies that identify the taxpayers
who are most likely under-reporting. Data mining can be used to create predictive
models that, learning from past audits, help audit selectors identify the best audit
candidates. Outlier-based detection can be used in audit selection applications. Data
mining techniques such as clustering can be used to automatically generate natural
peer groups based on a possibly large number of metrics and detect the outliers to be
audited.188 Data analytics would help tax administrations in allocating resources of
tax compliance efficiently and would assist taxpayers by narrowing the gap in legal
interpretation.189 Tax administrators could enhance the use of data analytics to
manage debts by applying a mix of predictive modelling and experimental
techniques to identify which cases should be subject to intervention, and which
specific interventions should be carried out.190
Experience shows that many tax authorities are already using some form of
data analytics to sample taxpayer data quickly and effectively, to develop risk
profiles, and to flag potential audit issues.191 Data analytics and machine learning are

187. See ORG. OF ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TECHNOLOGY TOOLS TO TACKLE TAX EVASION AND
TAX FRAUD 6–7 (2017), https://www.oecd.org/tax/crime/technology-tools-to-tackle-tax-evasion-and-taxfraud.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4CU-53WN].
188. “Clustering” is a Machine Learning technique that involves the grouping of data points. See
generally T. Soni Madhulatha, An Overview on Clustering Methods, 2 IOSR J. ENGINEERING 719 (2012).
Given a set of data points, we can use a clustering algorithm to classify each data point into a specific
group. Id.
189. See Benjamin Alarie, Anthony Niblett, & Albert Yoon, Data Analytics and Tax Law 3 (May 23,
2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406784 [https://perma.cc/CU78-JHVF].
190. See ORG. OF ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV, ADVANCED ANALYTICS FOR BETTER TAX
ADMINISTRATION: PUTTING DATA TO WORK 11 (2016), https://www.oecd.org/publications/advancedanalytics-for-better-tax-administration-9789264256453-en.htm [https://perma.cc/E7WX-P8Q8].
191. See Tim Gillis, Adrienne McStocker & Alec Percival, Indirect Tax Compliance in an Era of Big
Data, 13 TAX PLAN. INT’L INDIRECT TAXES 3 (2015); Niall Campbell, Tax Policy and Administration in
an Era of Big Data, 12 TAX PLAN. INT’L 2 (2014).
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used to detect suspicious dealers using certain sensitive parameters of data.192
Businesses themselves are discovering and using the potential of data analytics to
reduce their costs of compliance. Some businesses are using an automated set of
rules that determines and controls tax decisions based on the transactional and master
data available.193 Policy makers are using big data as well.194 The OECD’s Changing
Tax Compliance Report of 2007 highlights how advanced analytics use predictive
and prescriptive approaches that incorporate statistical and machine learning
techniques to better inform decisions about resource deployment, intervention and
policy design.195 These trends of tax compliance technologies are rising
worldwide,196 and raising questions of privacy as well.197 Accordingly, it is likely
that tax compliance technologies will eventually affect the states’ sales tax systems
substantially, not just for remote sellers, but for local sellers as well.
Similar to the recommendations in a previous co-authored paper on VAT,
with my colleague Professor Orly Mazur, I think that payment intermediaries could,
and should, play an important role in collecting sales taxes in the post-Wayfair era.198
Payment intermediaries’ data, including the zip codes of credit cards, could, and
should, be used to determine the sales tax jurisdiction. Although the OECD explored
and rejected this type of approach in a study conducted by the Technology Technical
Advisory Group (TAG) in 2000, I disagree with the report’s conclusions and find its
reasoning unpersuasive. Specifically, the TAG Report explored whether credit cards
provide the necessary information to verify the place of consumption, concluding
192. See Priya Mehta, Jithin Mathews, Sandeep Kumar, K. Suryamukhi, Ch. Sobhan Babu, S.V.
Visweswara Rao, Vishal Shivapujimath, & Dikshant Bisht. Big Data Analytics for Tax Administration, in
ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT AND THE INFORMATION SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE 47, 47 (July 2019).
193. See Chris Downing, Leo Van Loo, Alexander Zegers & Roger Haenen, Technology, Data and
Innovation – Essentials for Indirect Tax Management, 13 TAX PLAN.
INT’L INDIRECT TAXES 3 (2015).
194. See Christian Baker, Jeremy Bejarano, Richard W. Evans, Kenneth L. Judd, & Kerk L. Phillips,
A Big Data Approach to Optimal Sales Taxation 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
20130, 2014).
195. See ORG. OF ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV, THE CHANGING TAX COMPLIANCE ENVIRONMENT
AND THE ROLE OF AUDIT 44-45 (2017), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/the-changing-taxcompliance-environment-and-the-role-of-audit_9789264282186-en [https://perma.cc/L5PP-3FQQ].
196. Thailand Revenue Department announced plans to track tax payments using blockchain and
machine learning. Anna Berman, Thai Revenue Department to Track Tax Payments Using Blockchain,
COINTELEGRAPH (November 6, 2018, 1:43 PM), https://cointelegraph.com/news/thai-revenuedepartment-to-track-tax-payments-using-blockchain [https://perma.cc/GRK3-HRH6]. The city of
Shenzhen in China announced a partnership with Tencent to use blockchain to create digital invoices and
eliminate the black market for counterfeit receipts. Sujha Sundararajan, Chinese City to Use Blockchain
in Fight Against Tax Evasion, COINDESK (May 25, 2018, 11:01 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/tencentpartners-with-city-authority-to-combat-tax-evasion-with-blockchain [https://perma.cc/H78Q-BJST]. The
Minister of the Economy in Germany announced he sought to use blockchain to prevent future dividendstripping frauds. Ministry of Economy Wants to Block Tax Fraud with Blockchain Technology,
HANDELSBLATT (November 22, 2018, 2:08 PM), https://tinyurl.com/yxnnjrc9 [https://perma.cc/U8UCM8XU].
197. See Eugenia Politou, Efthimios Alepis & Constantinos Patsakis, Profiling Tax and Financial
Behavior with Big Data Under the GDPR, 35 COMPUT. L. & SEC. REV. 306, 307 (2019); Brendan WalkerMunro, Use of Big Data Analytics by Tax Authorities, in LEGAL REGULATIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND
ISSUES SURROUNDING DIGITAL DATA (2020).
198. See Azam & Mazur, supra note 4.
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that severe commercial limitations make credit cards not viable for this purpose.199
According to the TAG’s analysis, a credit card’s billing address does not always
represent the place of consumption because online consumption could take place
while travelling.200 This assertion is true, but in most cases the majority of
consumption generally occurs at the jurisdiction of residency. Once the delivery
address is different from the billing address, and once there are indications of a
different place of consumption, additional parameters could be used.
I acknowledge that using credit cards to verify the address and sharing that
information with suppliers for tax purposes “raises privacy and confidentiality
concerns”201 to some extent. Thus, it is necessary to balance individuals’ privacy
concerns against the tax collection concerns in a proportional manner.202 My
proposal seeks to achieve this balance by limiting the transfer of data. In particular,
instead of providing the full billing address to the merchant, I suggest that credit card
companies only share the zip code with the supplier. This amount of information
would limit the infringement of privacy while also providing the supplier with
sufficient information with which to verify the customer’s place of consumption and
apply the appropriate jurisdiction’s sales tax rate.203 This approach has seen success
in countries that have adopted it recently. 204
In recent years, the role of financial institutions in enhancing tax
compliance has risen.205 For example, the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act
(FATCA) imposed obligations and costs on financial institutions worldwide to
enhance tax compliance.206 Similarly, section 6050W of the Internal Revenue Code
required banks, third party settlement organizations, and others to send annual
reports to the IRS that contain information on payments made to merchants via debit
or credit cards, or certain electronic means, to enable comparison between this data
199. ORG. OF ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., REPORT BY THE TECHNOLOGY TECHNICAL ADVISORY
GROUP (TAG) (2000), http://www.oecd.org/tax/consumption/1923248.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7VM57YX].
200. Id. at 41.
201. Id. at 42.
202. See Andrew Leahey, Tax, Technology and Privacy: The Coming Collision, SSRN
(July 2, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3431476 [https://perma.cc/6YM8-HSTF].
203. See Adam Thimmesch, Tax Privacy, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 375 (2018) (describing the meaning and
scope of tax privacy).
204. See Sony Kassman, E-Commerce Tax Avoidance Leads Banks Being Tapped as Collectors,
BLOOMBERG L. NEWS: DAILY TAX REP. (Sept. 4, 2019), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-reportinternational/e-commerce-tax-avoidance-leads-to-banks-being-tapped-as-collectors
[https://perma.cc/CLN6-MCQX].
205. See RONEN PALAN, RICHARD MURPHY & CHRISTIAN CHAVAGNEUX, Institutional Attacks on Tax
Havens, in TAX HAVENS: HOW GLOBALIZATION REALLY WORKS, 203 (2010); Mark Hampton & John
Christensen, Offshore Pariahs? Small Island Economies, Tax Havens, and the Re-Configuration of Global
Finance, 30 WORLD DEV. 1657 (2002); Niels Johannsen & Gabriel Zucman, The End of Bank Secrecy?
– An Evaluation of the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown, 6 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 65 (2014).
206. See Foreign Account Tax Compliance, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations
/foreign-account-tax-compliance-act-fatca [https://perma.cc/VFD2-H8AW ] (last updated May 20, 2020);
Harvey, Jr., supra note 6; Itai Grinberg, Beyond FATCA: An Evolutionary Moment for the International
Tax System (Jan. 27, 2012) (Working Draft) (on file with Georgetown L.: The Scholarly Commons),
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsred
ir=1&article=1162&context=fwps_papers [https://perma.cc/69BN-7GCA].
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and the reported data on their tax returns.207 These and other measures use financial
institutions to enhance tax compliance, reduce tax fraud and evasion, and close the
tax gap. The same idea holds for sales tax purposes, and I expect it to be even more
effective. As the economic literature suggests, imposing, reporting, and withholding
obligations on payment intermediaries increases the probability of detection, which
increases the deterrence effect and reduces tax evasion.208
In the end, I argue that payment intermediaries could, and should, collect
state sales taxes at least on online transactions. These intermediaries play a critical
role in almost every digital transaction. Moreover, these payment intermediaries
already collect, store, and update information related to their customers for
regulatory reasons and for payment processing purposes.209 Thus, these entities
already have the information necessary to assess the sales tax on online transactions
appropriately. Even in cases where further data concerning the goods may be
necessary, these entities could receive more information automatically and
electronically from the vendor involved in the transaction. Given these features and
the rapid development and expansion of the digital economy, I recommend that
intermediaries collect sales tax on digital transactions in real time during the payment
processing. In other words, payment intermediaries should split payments into price
and tax components, then remit the tax to the appropriate state or clearinghouse. This
approach has seen increased use recently and is showing effectiveness and efficiency
in tax collection.210
C.

Foreign Online Sellers

Following Wayfair, foreign online sellers are obliged to collect sales taxes
from their sales to customers in the states as long as they meet the relevant nexus and
threshold requirements.211 This obligation is also justified from a policy perspective
207. Lederman, supra note 6, at 1750; E.g. Kahn & Polsky, supra note 6, at 165; see also T.D. 9496,
2010–43 I.R.B. 484 (providing another prominent example of reporting obligations requiring reporting
entities, at the end of each calendar year, to file an information return with the IRS that reports the gross
amount of that merchant’s transactions for the year and provides a corresponding Form 1099-K to the
merchant).
208. See Joel B. Slemrod, Tax Compliance and Enforcement: An Overview of New Research and Its
Policy Implications (Ross Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 1302, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2726077 [https://perma.cc/6GH4-A6DF]; Joel Slemrod, Brett Collins,
Jeffery L. Hoopes, Daniel Reck & Michael Sebastiani, Does Credit-Card Information Reporting Improve
Small-Business Tax Compliance?, 149 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (2017).
209. See Lamensch, supra note 163.
210. See European Comm’n, supra note 6; HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, U.K., ALTERNATIVE METHOD
OF VAT COLLECTION – SPLIT PAYMENT: CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 6; HM REVENUE &
CUSTOMS, U.K., ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF VAT COLLECTION SUMMARY OF RESPONSES, supra note 6.
211. See Adam Thimmesch, Darien Shanske & David Gamage, Wayfair: Marketplaces and Foreign
Vendors, ST. TAX NOTES, October 8, 2018, at 18; William Hoke, Enforceability of Wayfair Decision on
Foreign Companies Unclear, ST. TAX NOTES, July 2, 2018, at 73; State Tax Implications of Wayfair for
Non-U.S. Companies with U.S. Customers: External Multistate Tax Alert, DELOITTE (June 28, 2018),
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to ensure a level playing field between American businesses and foreign
businesses.212 So far, several themes have emerged since Wayfair which suggest that
most overseas sellers are likely to comply.213 Foreign sellers’ awareness of their tax
liability is rising, as well as states’ enforcement capabilities through marketplace
facilitators. E-retailers in Europe tend to understand the rationale behind Wayfair
based on their familiarity with the E.U.’s VAT system. Overseas retailers that rely
on marketplace platforms to sell their products—a rapidly growing segment within
e-commerce—will be hustled into tax compliance whether they like it or not. States
have enforcement abilities on foreign sellers through the banks, borders, and
marketplace platforms.214
It is true that this obligation implicates Congress’s power over foreign
commerce under the dormant foreign commerce clause, as well as the import-export
clause, but it seems that the obligation will pass judicial scrutiny as long as it passes
the tests under Wayfair and the principles of fair international trade. The dormant
foreign commerce clause forbids states from discriminating against international
commerce, just as the dormant interstate commerce clause forbids states from
discriminating against interstate commerce.215 Accordingly, Wayfair’s rationale
likely applies to foreign sellers, as imposing collection duties does not discriminate
against international commerce. To the contrary, it levels playing fields between
local, interstate, and international retailers. Under the dormant foreign commerce
clause, the constitutionality of any state tax would necessitate an examination of
whether the tax “creates a substantial risk of international multiple taxation,”216 and
whether the state tax impairs federal uniformity.217 Both tests are likely met so long
as states follow the rest of the world’s well-established destination principle. The
destination principle reduces the risks of international multiple taxation since the
sales tax is imposed in one jurisdiction: the state of destination. As to federal
uniformity, there is no risk since there is no federal sales tax, only state and local
sales taxes.
The import-export clause is limited to prohibiting states from imposing
“Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports,”218 but Wayfair imposes sales tax
collection duties on sales to customers in the jurisdiction, whether the seller is from
implications-of-the-wayfair-ruling-for-non-us-multinational-companies.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C99YFCW7].
212. See Robert Goulder, Parlez-Vous Wayfair? Foreign Lessons on Taxing Remote Sales, TAX
NOTES TODAY INT’L, July 16, 2018; cf. Remote Seller Resources, SALES TAX INST.,
https://www.salestaxinstitute.com/resources/remote-seller-resources [https://perma.cc/AUT3-T7CK].
213. See Michael Bologna, Foreign Sellers likely to comply with ‘Wayfair’-Inspired Tax Laws,
BLOOMBERG TAX (June 21, 2019, 8:01 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-reportstate/foreign-sellers-likely-to-comply-with-wayfair-inspired-tax-laws [https://perma.cc/JF72-33Y2].
214. See Richard D. Pomp, Foreign Remote Vendors and the Possibility of Non-Compliance: Is the
Only Thing We Have to Fear is the Fear Itself?, 37 J. ST. TAX’N 39 (2019).
215. See Michel S. Knoll & Ruth Mason, The Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause After Wynne, FAC.
SCHOLARSHIP PENN L., 2159, 2020, https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2159
[https://perma.cc/XWU9-NY7N].
216. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 319 n.18 (1994) (quoting Japan
Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451 (1979)).
217. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448.
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the state, out-of-state, or foreign. Further, applying Wayfair to foreign sellers does
not contradict the three-part test219 corresponding with the three goals of the importexport clause: It does not contradict any one federal voice; it does not infringe on
any major source of revenue of the federal government; and it does not contradict
harmony among the states since one state is collecting sales taxes according to the
destination principle.
However, the burdens of compliance with such duties are enormous when
45 states and the District of Columbia impose a general sales tax and thousands of
local jurisdictions add to that their local sales taxes. Hence, a foreign online seller
who has substantial sales in a few states will be obligated to register with several
jurisdictions and account for their sales taxes. This obligation will include collecting,
filling, and remitting taxes, which requires knowledge of local tax law and
transactional handling of the tax through banks and financial institutions. In addition,
states could face challenges in enforcing collection duties on foreign vendors.220
The measures I have suggested in this article would simplify compliance,
reduce costs, and enhance collection of sales taxes for all remote sellers, American
or foreign. However, I think that further unique measures for foreign remote sellers
would enhance compliance effectively and efficiently. Among these measures, I
suggest seriously considering the following: (1) Allowing foreign remote sellers to
register with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency and allow them to
account for sales taxes in all states through a cloud-based, centralized, automated
gateway. This option should be open in addition to the possibility of registration with
one state of registration and accounting for sales taxes in all states through the state
of registration in a cloud-based centralized automated system, as I suggested for
American remote sellers in Part III.B. (2) Assigning a bank account designed for
collecting and withholding sales taxes on international transactions in real time.
During the payment process, the customer would transfer and deposit sales taxes to
this designated account with a clearinghouse. This collection method would ensure
compliance and remittance of the sales taxes. It would reduce the need for opening
multiple bank accounts and transferring funds to remit the taxes. (3) Developing
international cooperation regimes, including exchange of information and mutual
assistance, either within existing frameworks or in new frameworks, to ensure
compliance and enforcement on international transactions.
Regarding enforcement on foreign vendors, there are good reasons to
believe that they would comply, but at the same time, compliance is not easy for
them.221 States should conduct further research to collect data on the issue and
measure the tax gap on foreign vendors so that they can enact further measures of
enforcement. I believe that publicizing the duties worldwide and cooperating with
foreign countries, as well as using tax compliance technologies, would enhance
foreign compliance. Just as the E.U. reduced the VAT gap, I believe that the states
could similarly reduce their sales tax gap through analogous measures. E.U. data
219. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
220. See Ryan Prete, Foreign Sellers Likely Safe from State Online Tax Frenzy Post-Wayfair,
BLOOMBERG TAX (July 12, 2018, 1:01 PM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/foreignsellers-likely-safe-from-state-online-tax-frenzy-post-wayfair?context=search&index=0
[https://perma.cc/24UC-FHF2].
221. See Thimmesch, Shanske & Gamage, supra note 211.
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revealed that the VAT gap had been closing constantly, although slowly.222 For
example, the VAT gap fell from €145.4 billion in 2016 to €137.5 billion in 2017. In
relative terms, the E.U.-wide gap dropped to 11.2 percent, down from 12.2 percent
in 2016. Fast estimates indicate that the VAT gap will likely continue its downward
trend and fall below €130 billion and 10 percent of the VAT Total Tax Liability in
2018.223
Congress could contribute to improving sales tax collection on international
transactions by foreign remote sellers. In this context, federal legislation would be
an appropriate legal tool to accommodate simple and efficient taxation of foreign
sellers. However, there is a complex dilemma because congressional legislation
would have substantial implications on general issues of international taxation of the
digital economy, including on the issues of digital permanent establishment and
digital services tax, which significantly affects the international interests of the
United States.224
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Wayfair saved the
states’ sales tax base and stopped waiting for Congress to resolve Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota’s ban on taxing remote sales without a seller’s physical presence in
the state. South Dakota’s legislation in Wayfair, together with the Supreme Court’s
confirmation of its constitutionality, started a revolution in the field of online
taxation. This revolution must continue on the same path—the state-by-state path—
as South Dakota’s success proves. Therefore, Congress should not impose
restrictions, or stop the states from implementing Wayfair and their taxation rights
according to the U.S. Constitution. This article traces the main milestones along the
path of this just and long journey of the states. However, that journey is not over.
The first suggestion is that states make appropriate policy decisions followed by
appropriate legal frameworks. The next proposal is extremely important and it
necessitates a multi-state framework of coordination and cooperation. Building upon
the Streamlines Sales and Use Tax Agreement, states should intensify the process of
harmonization and simplification by looking toward the E.U. VAT directive. I call
for establishing a one-stop shop that would account for sales taxation in all states
with one state of registration. Additionally, I suggest that states establish a
clearinghouse to account for the balances between the states. I strongly support the
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use of technologies of compliance, especially cloud computing, blockchain, big data,
and machine learning, to enhance collecting sales taxation on a real-time basis. To
complete the journey, Congress could, and should, assist in applying these measures
to international transactions. I argue that this full package of measures would
enhance sales taxation in the era of digitalization and e-commerce post Wayfair.

